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Preface 
 
 
RAYMOND HINNEBUSCH 
 
 
We are pleased to present VOL 11, NO 1 Against All Odds, 
Intricate Dynamics of Syria’s Reconstruction. This issue of 
Syria Studies includes five articles; the first three of which were 
produced as part of a World bank (WB) initiative, while the last 
(State-led urban development in Syria and the prospects for ef-
fective post-conflict reconstruction by Nadine Almanasfi) is a 
separate study, though clearly pertinent to the content of this is-
sue.  
In mid-2018, the Centre for Syrian Studies at the University 
of St Andrews (CSS) was asked by the WB to contribute to an 
initiative entitled: Building for Peace: Reconstruction for Secu-
rity, Sustainable Peace, and Equity in MENA. This issue of Syria 
Studies shares several of the background papers that were pro-
duced by members of the CSS team: (1) The weaponization of 
Syria’s reconstruction, a preliminary sketch  by Omar Imady; 
(2) Geo-economics: Russia and Iran in Syria by Faysal Itani; and 
(3) The geopolitics of Syria’s reconstruction: a case of matry-
oshka by Erwin Van Veen. The CSS would like to acknowledge 
the support the WB provided which made these studies possible. 
It is important to emphasise that the information and views 
shared by the authors of these studies are their own and should 
not be regarded as representing the views of the WB or the CSS. 
Finally, it should be noted that several additional studies 
produced under the WB initiative will be published in the forth-
coming issue of Syria Studies. 
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1 
The Weaponization of Syria’s Reconstruction: 
A Preliminary Sketch   
 
OMAR IMADY 
 
Introduction 
It is indeed instructive that discussions of reconstruction often 
fail to provide a definition, or at the very least a general expla-
nation, of what exactly they mean by the term. The assumption 
appears to be that the term is so readily understood to not require 
an explanation. Another common characteristic of such discus-
sions is a preoccupation with how international, regional and na-
tional players are attempting to advance, or undermine, 
reconstruction. The focus on how various parties are interacting 
with a process, however, should not be confused, as often is the 
case, with a focus on the actual process. While the former is con-
sumed with context, the latter attempts to shed light on agency. 
To focus on agency is to invariably focus on yet another con-
spicuously neglected subject, the actual communities that have 
been the victim of partial or wholescale destruction. Not only do 
discussions of Syria’s reconstruction generally remain loyal to 
these shortcomings, they additionally reflect a very determined 
attempt to weaponize the idea of reconstruction in various ways 
and towards various ends.  
The weaponization of Syria’s reconstruction started as early 
as 2012, and by 2016, with the end of the battle for Aleppo, it 
had accelerated rapidly, reaching full culmination with the pass-
ing of the ‘Strengthening America's Security in the Middle East 
Act’ (February 5. 2019). The focus here is on how this weapon-
ization was achieved conceptually, rather than operationally (i.e. 
social media dissemination). This form of weaponization may be 
termed ‘conceptual weaponization’ as it provides the ideas, facts 
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and statements that are subsequently used by social media activ-
ists to reinforce their messages. The aim is to shed light not only 
on how distant the idea of reconstruction ultimately is from the 
realities it was meant to be preoccupied with, but also on the ex-
tent to which reconstruction became a front for the political and 
economic empowerment of various factions and players. 
 
Conceptual Weaponization 
The weaponization of political discourse, though now associated 
with the internet and social media, is an ancient craft, and exam-
ples of how it was articulated can be identified long before the 
internet arrived. Granted, the subject is very broad and complex, 
but a preliminary sketch of a very specific branch of weaponiza-
tion is attempted here. Conceptual weaponization involves the 
creation of an understanding of a political term, an understand-
ing that is closed (i.e. it does not allow for multiple interpreta-
tions), entrapping (i.e. it is integrated with inbuilt incentives), 
and exclusionary (i.e. it is predicated on the creation of an en-
emy).1 The language used by ‘The Covenant of the League of 
Nations’ to describe the idea of the ‘Mandate’, including that of 
France over Syria, illustrates all three characteristics: 
 
 
                                                     
1 On the weaponization of language, see: Singer, P. W., & Brooking, E. T. 
(2018). Likewar: The weaponization of social media; Jeremiah Clabough, 
Mark Pearcy, (2018) "“Wild words” – analyzing angry rhetoric in American 
politics", Social Studies Research and Practice, Vol. 13 Issue: 3, pp.369-
382; Herrman, John. “If everything can be ‘weaponized,’ what should we 
fear?” The New York Times Magazine. March 14, 2017. https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/03/14/magazine/if-everything-can-be-weaponized-what-
should-we-fear.html; and Apter, Emily. “Weaponized Thought: Ethical Mil-
itance and the Group Subject.” Grey Room 14 (Winter 2004); Allenby, Brad 
and Joel Garreau, “Weaponized Narrative Is the New Battlespace,” Defense 
One [3 January 2017]. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/01/weapon-
ized-narrative-newbattlespace/134284/; Katerji, O. (2018, September 13). 
The Kremlin has weaponised doubt in Syria – and Labour is helping. Avail-
able at: https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2018/09/krem-
lin-has-weaponised-doubt-syria-and-labour-helping 
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Article 22: 
“To those colonies … which are inhabited by peoples not yet 
able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the 
modern world, there should be applied the principle that the 
well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust 
of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust 
should be embodied in this Covenant.” 
The idea of the mandate is conceptually closed in the sense that 
its nature and purpose are treated as though they were irrefutable 
facts. It is entrapping because it is promising unconditional au-
thority to the countries administering the mandate (i.e. Britain 
and France), and civilizational advancement to the populations 
they are being authorized to administer. And it is, finally, exclu-
sionary in the sense that it implies that those who don’t subscribe 
to this understanding are a priori hostile to the development and 
best interests of the populations it oversees and working against 
what the international community has decreed. 
 
Reconstruction as utopia 
The first major usage of the term reconstruction is found in the 
narrative of the American Civil War (1861-1865).2 Even then, 
the term carried just as many myths (deliberately crafted, and at 
times possibly well-intentioned) as it does today. The myth, in 
mid-nineteenth century America, was that a post-war union can 
be reconstructed or, that the north was genuinely interested in its 
reconstruction. The actual way within which the term was un-
derstood by the victors was that the South (not the union) had to 
be radically reconstructed. The 1867-1868 Reconstruction Acts 
organized the South into occupied military districts and condi-
tioned the restoration of the ex-Confederate states to the Union 
on the condition of ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment (which 
                                                     
2 On reconstruction in the context of the American Civil War, see, Kirsch, S 
& Flint, Colin. (2011). “Introduction: Reconstruction and the worlds that 
war makes.” in Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-War Ge-
ographies, Farnham, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 3-28. 
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gave ex-slaves full citizenship). The myth, however, was not 
only that the victors were uninterested in the reconstruction of 
what was, but on a far more important level, the myth was that 
the victors could in fact succeed, irrespective of their victory, in 
reconstructing the South on their terms. Even one century later, 
the Civil Rights movement encountered a South that was cultur-
ally very hostile to the type of reconstruction the North had ear-
lier envisioned. So, in this sense, the term reconstruction carries 
a double illusion; not only is the proclaimed objective not the 
real objective of those who are using it, but even the real objec-
tive is ultimately very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.  
From its earliest usage, the term ‘reconstruction’ implied 
restoration, or a return to a previous, often idealized, reality. At 
its most basic level, it implied the rebuilding of structures that 
were destroyed during war, and at a higher level of sophistica-
tion, it implied a rebuilding of not only physical structures, but 
of political, economic and social frameworks, which, in their to-
tality, constituted a specific moment in time that ‘reconstruction’ 
would restore.3 Because reconstruction is an activity, a method, 
                                                     
3 On the theory and applications of reconstruction, see, Abu Ismail, K., 
Imady, O., Kuncic, A., and Nujum, U., 2016. Syria At War: Five Years Later. 
ESCWA & St Andrews. Available at: 
https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publica-
tions/files/syria-war-five-years.pdf; Heydemann, Steven, "Beyond Fragility: 
Syria and the Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States" (2018). Middle 
East Studies: Faculty Publications, Smith College, Northampton, MA. Avail-
able at: https://scholarworks.smith.edu/mes_facpubs/3; Arnold, Margaret; 
Elwan, Ann E.; Kreimer, Alcira I.; Muscat, Robert J.. 2000. Bosnia and Her-
zegovina - Post-conflict reconstruction (English). OED Evaluation country 
case study series; post-conflict reconstruction. Washington, DC: World Bank 
Group. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/cu-
rated/en/148931468201253246/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-Post-conflict-re-
construction; Barakat, S. 2005, After the conflict: reconstruction and 
development in the aftermath of war. I.B.Taurus; Cohen, Roberta. (2003). 
Reconstruction and Development Need Security To Be Effective (Afghani-
stan). [online] Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/arti-
cles/reconstruction-and-development-need-security-to-be-effective-
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and not an objective in itself, it cannot possibly be the destina-
tion. Hence, the focus shifts almost naturally from the process to 
the new reality it is seeking to actualize. When describing this 
new reality, the tendency is to speak in terms of a utopia that not 
only never existed, but which seems difficult to actualize under 
the best conditions and even in countries that have not undergone 
violence and destruction. Conceptual weaponization is achieved 
when features of these utopias become the standards upon which 
any planned reconstruction effort is judged. If it does not con-
form, it is labeled (politely) as an instrument of recreating the 
conditions that led to conflict, or (less diplomatically) as com-
plicit in war crimes against the Syrian people. 
The National Agenda for the Future of Syria (NAFS) pro-
vides one of the most elaborate explanations of this post-recon-
struction utopia. NAFS was launched by UN ESCWA in 2012 
with the aim of enaging “ ... Syrian experts and stakeholders in 
developing policy alternatives for Syria in preparation for a post-
agreement phase.”The Principles for a vision of ‘Syria 2030’ 
were reached through an extensive exercise lead by Syrians from 
across the political spectrum. In their totality, these principles 
encapsulate the utopia that the reconstruction of Syria will give 
birth to. They may be synthesized and paraphrased as follows: 
i. A political agreement that guarantees “a comprehensive 
transition” towards a Syria where “a culture of democ-
racy is built and practiced, mutual political trust is re-es-
tablished among the main political players, and the rule 
of law, equality and citizenship is established.”    
ii. The right of the displaced and the refugees to “a safe, 
dignified and voluntary return to their homes (or to any 
                                                     
afghanistan/; Jabareen, Yosef. (2013). Conceptualizing “Post-Conflict Re-
construction” and “Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction” of Failed States. 
[online] International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 26(2) pp. 
107-125. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10767-012-
9118-3;  
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other location inside the country they voluntarily choose 
to return to).”  
iii. A national reconciliation unto which all “Syrians are in-
vited and encouraged to contribute”. 
iv. A just and balanced development that directly contrib-
utes to stability, peace building and reconciliation at the 
local and the national levels that is tangibly manifested 
in the availability “of rehabilitated social and physical in-
frastructure” and; that “empowers people, especially the 
most vulnerable and poor, to attain their basic needs.” 
v. A governance framework that allows “the national ad-
ministrative structure to be comprehensive, participa-
tory, transparent, accountable, result-based, and achieve 
gender equality.” 
 
On the surface, these principles provide a vision of an inclu-
sive, democratic Syria that one would at least hope the vast ma-
jority of Syrians would concur with. On a more subtle level, 
however, these principles not only create false expectations in 
terms of what reconstruction can result in, but they also validate 
the assumption that ‘reconstruction’ is an actual legitimate pro-
cess that has a credible record, and that the only concern is 
whether or not it will be guided by an appropriate vision. The 
catastrophic failures of reconstruction in countries like Iraq and 
Afghanistan, for example, are clearly here irrelevant or at the 
very least are regarded as examples of what will not happen in 
Syria.  
The Syrian regime has its own vision of reconstruction, 
which is deliberately vague, but equally utopian. In various 
speeches and interviews, the Syrian president made scattered 
references to reconstruction.  
 
“… the more arduous challenge lies in rebuilding, socially and 
psychologically, those who have been affected by the crisis. It 
will not be easy to eliminate the social effects of the crisis, espe-
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cially extremist ideologies. Real reconstruction is about devel-
oping minds, ideologies and values. Infrastructure is valuable, 
but not as valuable as human beings; reconstruction is about per-
petuating both.” (Interview with the German Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung newspaper 17/June/2013) 
 
And again: 
 
“The rebuilding of minds and the reform of people is the major 
challenge rather than the rebuilding of the infrastructure. When 
they started this war against us, they knew they would destroy 
the infrastructure, and they knew that we would rebuild it, but 
what is much harder is how to interact with the intellectual struc-
tures and we must not fail in confronting this challenge.” (Asad’s 
speech, 18 February, 2019 – my translation) 
 
Asad’s emphasis on the rebuilding of human capital under-
scores the regime’s concern with the fact that even if Syria is 
physically rebuilt, this will have no impact on the extent to which 
millions of Syrians will reman fierce enemies of everything the 
regime stands for. Hence the emphasis on rebuilding the intel-
lectual foundations of Syrian society implies a type of recon-
struction akin, in sensibility (though clearly not in nature), to 
what the North had in mind after the American civil war. The 
South had to be culturally restructured, and in Asad’s mind, 
Syria, Syrians opposed to the regime in particular, require intel-
lectual restructuring.   
A far more elaborate utopia was identified by the particpants 
in Sochi (Janurary 2018). Here reconstruction is seen as the 
grand summation of what all Syrians (represented at Sochi) 
aspire to. Twelve major principles that sound more like the 
manifesto of a political party are articulated: 
1. Sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and unity of 
the Syrian Arab Republic. 
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2. Syria’s national sovereign equality and rights regarding non-
intervention. 
3. Syrian people shall determine the future of their country by 
the ballot box. 
4. Syrian Arab Republic shall be a democratic and non-sec-
tarian state. 
5. Syria to be committed to national unity, social peace. 
6. Continuity and improved performance of state and public in-
stitutions. 
7. A strong national army that carries out its duties in accord-
ance with the constitution. 
8. Commitment to combat - terrorism, fanaticism, extremism 
and sectarianism. 
9. Respect and protection of human rights and public freedoms. 
10. Value placed on Syria’s society and national identity, and its 
history of diversity. 
11. Fighting poverty and providing support for the elderly and 
other vulnerable groups. 
12. Preservation and protection of national heritage and the natu-
ral environment. 
We even have negative utopias, that is utopias that identify 
what reconstruction should not involve but are ironically just as 
utopian in what they assume can be achieved in lieu of the model 
they are concerned with negating. In Beyond fragility: Syria and 
the challenges of reconstruction in fierce states, Steven Hey-
demann writes: 
 
“Thus, the aim of post-conflict reconstruction is not to return 
war-torn societies and states to their pre-war condition, but to 
make use of the space that violent conflict is presumed to create 
to put in place institutions, norms, and practices that address the 
causes of violence and provide a basis for effective governance 
and sustainable peace.” 
What all these utopias have in common is the closed nature 
of their logic. It is closed because there is a circular link between 
their assumptions and conclusions. They do not, for example, 
question whether or not their vision can be achieved, how it will 
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be achieved, or if it has been achieved elsewhere. Their premise 
is that it is required, for various reasons, and hence it should be 
pursued. More importantly, they all come with direct and indi-
rect warnings that caution us from the dangers of not adhering to 
their prescriptions, from the recreation of the climate conducive 
to conflict, to the strengthening of the regime and its allies. 
 
Reconstruction as an Opportunity 
As early as February 2012, the idea of ‘preparing’ for the recon-
struction of Syria starts to gain currency. The only challenge was 
how to make this idea more attractive. The message purports to 
be an invitation for the international community to be prepared 
to assist Syria once the war is over. In actuality, the message 
involves articulating an opportunity, a multi-layered opportunity 
that has something in it for everyone. It is first an opportunity 
for Syrians opposed to the regime to cast themselves as trusted 
experts who are in a better position to provide such expertise 
than their international counterparts. In August 2012, a group of 
Syrian intellectuals created a think tank, The Day After; Support-
ing a Democratic Transition in Syria or TDA. TDA aimed at 
providing “a detailed framework of principles, goals and recom-
mendations … for addressing challenges in six key fields: rule 
of law; transitional justice; security sector reform; constitutional 
design; electoral system design; and post-conflict social and eco-
nomic reconstruction [emphasis mine].” With time, the dimen-
sions of the opportunity become clearer to the organized 
opposition, and by November 2012, the term begins to be in-
voked with more assertiveness: “The incoming or transitional 
government in Damascus will confront not just the physical and 
social destruction of the war effort, as well as its collateral ef-
fects on regional stability, but also the deep legacies of a 40-year 
dictatorship. Its urgent domestic tasks will include … recon-
structing infrastructure and the state apparatus …” The ‘oppor-
tunity’ here is for the opposition to prove itself credible and 
worthy of becoming the new leadership of Syria. The myth, no 
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doubt, is the idea that members of the opposition have any expe-
rience in building, or rebuilding, anything akin to what they as-
pire to undertake. Once again, the ‘double illusions’ apply both 
the professed message and the actual message are equally de-
tached from reality. 
Reconstruction is foremost, however, an opportunity for the 
Syrian regime to signal the end of the conflict and for the initia-
tion of its international rehabilitation. Yet, without a price tag 
placed on it, the opportunity remains not adequately attractive, 
nor weaponized. The price tag required is a financial one. Other 
types, like the survey conducted by UNRWA in mid-2013 which 
estimated that it would take around 30 years for Syria’s economy 
to recover, are not helpful and will be duly ignored by players 
across the board. In June 2013, we are informed that a six mem-
ber UN team lead by Abdallah Dardari, Syria’s ex-Deputy Prime 
Minister for Economic Affairs, has arrived at the first estimate 
of what it would cost to reconstruct Syria: $60 billion. The figure 
is first repeated, then is systematically increased “… the country 
would need at least $80 billion to put the economy back to what 
it was prior to the uprising …”; “Syria’s interim minister: $100 
billion needed for reconstruction”; “Rebuilding damaged physi-
cal infrastructure will be a monumental task, with reconstruction 
cost estimates in the range of $100 to $200 billion”; and the final 
number is left to be identified by the president himself: “Syrian 
President Bashar Assad estimated Thursday that it may take up 
to $400 billion to reconstruct Syria after the conflict …” 
On the surface, these numbers are attempts to capture dam-
age and, in turn, the costs of rebuilding. The sources responsible 
for their initial computation (e.g. ESCWA, the National Agenda 
for Syria, etc.) are generally technical bodies, well intended and 
as objective as it is possible when it comes to a subject as in-
flamed as Syria. The point here isn’t to cast doubt on why such 
numbers were calculated, but rather on how these numbers are 
subsequently weaponized to achieve very different objectives. 
As those who have actually gone through the economic exercise 
of calculating them would assert, these numbers tell us nothing 
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about how they will be, or can be, used to finance the rebuilding 
of anything. At best they measure the value of what was de-
stroyed. The logical fallacy of the idea of reconstruction is that 
you can in fact rebuild if only you had the resources required. 
This assumption was dramatically disproven in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and, according to at least some economists, it didn’t even 
apply during the implementation of the Marshal Plan. Recon-
struction efforts in post-WWII Europe were never fully depend-
ent on US assistance, and more often than not, were primarily 
based on local resources. The primary success stories took place 
where there was something already on the ground, a thirsty po-
tential already attempting on its own to reconstruct, and then, 
subsequently, benefitting from a financial contribution that it 
was ready to do without. The US spent around $13 billion dollars 
to reconstruct Europe, (now equivalent to approximately $100 
billion); already less than what the US has so far spent on the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan. Indeed, corruption depleted the 
vast majority of these resources, and much of the same applies 
on the reconstruction of Iraq. In fact, it would not be difficult to 
show how the higher the number allocated for reconstruction, 
the more likely it will be misused. The point here, however, is 
that all of this is well understood and purposely employed by the 
various political camps fighting over Syria. The premise appears 
to be is that the higher the price tag, the more attractive the invi-
tation is (i.e. a country that requires $400 billion to reconstruct 
is far more attractive than a country that requires $100 billion). 
Indeed, some of the headings almost read like an investment op-
portunity: “A Los Angeles banker, the head of a Middle Eastern 
investment bank and retired General Wesley Clark plan to an-
nounce Monday the formation of an investment fund to help re-
build Syria.” Not only is it an investment opportunity, it is one 
which many are deemed ‘unworthy’ of: “Talking about the re-
construction of Syria’s war-torn regions, President Assad said 
companies from different countries have already offered their 
services in rebuilding Syria. While French and Swiss firms are 
among those ready to participate, the Syrian government will do 
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its best to give Russian companies the best contracts …” After 
all, the price of being part of such a lucrative opportunity is to 
have supported the Syrian regime, or, at the very least, to be will-
ing to suspend all the rhetoric and activities that question its le-
gitimacy. 
 
Reconstruction as punishment  
In more practical terms, reconstruction can also be weaponized 
to exclude, or include, legitimise or demonize.4 The Syrian re-
gime understood this well and proceeded to enact laws to rede-
fine demographically and economically post-war Syria into what 
Asad described as “a healthier and more homogeneous society.” 
Though as noted above, these top down approaches to social re-
alities consistently fail, the suffering and dispossession they can 
result in is very real. Take for example the town of Darayya, lo-
cated 8 km south-west of the centre of Damascus, and belonging 
administratively, to the Rural Damascus governorate. In August 
2016, the town fell to regime forces, and the remaining popula-
tion were resettled in Idlib (7700), and Herjaleh (600).  It is un-
clear what happened to the original 78,000 (at the very least) 
inhabitants of Darayya. It seems likely that long before August 
2016, thousands left the town to either other parts of Syria, or 
left Syria altogether. What concerns us is that Darayya today is 
largely vacant of its original indigenous inhabitants and, hence, 
to speak of a reconstruction program in Darayya would be to 
normalize a demographic distortion. Yet, in early 2017, a com-
mittee for the reconstruction of Darayya was formed under the 
Prime Minister’s Office. Much of the same would apply on nu-
merous other towns in Syria, stretching from Ifrin, in the north-
west, to Daraa, in the southeast.  
Reconstruction that is based on demographic distortions is 
similar to reconstruction that is based on physical distortions. 
While the former targets people who moved into an area after its 
                                                     
4 See for example, Wintermute, Bobby A.; Ulbrich, David J.: Race and Gen-
der in Modern Western Warfare. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg 2019, p. 
338. 
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original inhabitants have been displaced, the latter redefines an 
area entirely. Southwest of Damascus, and not too far from Dar-
rayya, is an area known as Basateen el-Razi. Prior to 2011, the 
area was home to thousands of people who were too poor to af-
ford regular houses, and who therefore built their shacks and 
ramshackle houses in the fields behind the houses of the Mezzeh 
highway. Today, a ‘reconstruction’ program has been initiated 
that aims at replacing these houses with skyscrapers and shop-
ping centres. It would be entirely different if the indigenous in-
habitants of Basateen el-Razi were the actual beneficiaries of 
such a program. As it stands, the program recreates a new phys-
ical reality and ignores the future prospects of returnees which, 
as studies have confirmed, in the vast majority of cases return to 
their own homes (even if such homes were partially damaged).  
     In the same vain, several decrees, from Law number 66 
(2012) to Law number 10 (2018), have created a situation where 
the indigenous inhabitants of an area will find it even harder to 
return to their towns and villages and repossess their homes, and 
land. The idea that a refugee or a displaced person must some-
how provide proof of ownership of a house that is most probably 
damaged or destroyed, and which was most probably built with-
out legal documentation, amounts to (at the very least) a strong 
disinvitation to return. Since Syrian refugees and the displaced 
already face numerous other obstacles that make their return dif-
ficult, these decrees make the hard even harder, and legitimize 
their inability to return.  
On the other side of the spectrum, reconstruction as an in-
strument of punishment was also employed by the West, the US 
in particular. The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act was first 
initiated in July 2016, and on the 15th of November 2016, it unan-
imously passed the House as The Caesar Syria Civilian Protec-
tion Act (HR 5732). After dying in previous congresses, another 
version, H.R. 1677 (115th), passed the House on May 17, 2017. 
It was considered by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
on September 26, 2018, and on the 3rd of October 2018, an up-
dated text of the bill was published. On the 19th of January 2019, 
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it passed the House, yet again, as the ‘Strengthening America's 
Security in the Middle East Act of 2019’. Finally, on the 5th of 
February 2019, it was passed by the Senate. The language of the 
Act that pertains to Syria is consistent with the objectives of pun-
ishment and exclusion: 
 
• Requires the President to impose sanctions on 
foreign individuals if the President determines that 
the foreign individual knowingly engages in any of 
the following activities (Title III, Subtitle A, Sec. 
312): 
• Knowingly provides significant financial, material, 
or technological support to, or knowingly engages 
in a significant transaction with the Government of 
Syria; 
• Knowingly sells or provides significant goods, 
services, technology, information, or other support 
that significantly facilitates the maintenance or 
expansion of the Government of Syria’s domestic 
production of natural gas, petroleum, or petroleum 
products; 
• Knowingly, directly or indirectly, provides 
significant construction or engineering services to 
the Government of Syria. 
The Strengthening America's Security in the Middle East Act is 
very clear on what should not take place, but it is not concerned 
with what should take place. Clarity on what should not happen 
and ambiguity on what should, has been a common feature of 
American foreign policy in Syria, and it is reminiscent of how 
the US interacted with the use of chemical weapons. The Syrian re-
gime should not use chemical weapons, US officials strongly 
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proclaimed, but its use of other forms of killing (e.g. barrel 
bombs) is ignored. In the same vain, countries should not support 
the reconstruction of Syria, but how the suffering of the refugees 
and the displaced will be alleviated is not an American security 
interest nor is it relevant to an Act that, by its very name, is con-
cerned with strengthening American policies.  
 
 
Conclusion 
When the history of the Syrian Uprising is finally written, one of 
the important aspects of this history will be the way in which 
certain ideas were weaponized by various actors. Such a history 
may begin with the regime’s mu’amirah or conspiracy theory 
that portrayed the protestors as agents of a foreign plot who prac-
ticed jihad alnikah or sexual jihad, move on to the opposition’s 
use of sa’it al sifr or zero hour to dramatize the immanent end of 
the regime, and would include how the West used an incremental 
(verbal) delegitimization of the regime (‘from Asad should step 
down’ to ‘Asad must go’) creating in the process the illusion that 
such delegitimization techniques are capable of impacting the 
regime’s survival. The latest, though unlikely to be the last, is 
the idea of reconstruction, an idea that carries with it the illusory 
promise of a phase beyond war where Syria’s rebirth would take 
place. What is perhaps distinct about reconstruction is the extent 
to which it was about the regime’s legitimacy, as opposed to its 
continuity. Past examples of weaponization were significantly 
instruments of actual war, when at stake was the very survival of 
the regime. Reconstruction, on the other hand, belongs to a battle 
over the regime’s international rehabilitation.  
The significance of The Strengthening America's Security 
in the Middle East Act lies in the blow it delivered to the regime’s 
attempt to restore its legitimacy through reconstruction. As 
noted above, the Act was first contemplated in mid-2016, and it 
took until February 2019 for it to be passed by the Senate. In 
only three months, (February-May 2019), the reconstruction of 
Syria has already started losing the coverage and momentum it 
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enjoyed until early 2019. The Syrian regime’s success in the 
weaponization of ideas during the war phase of Syria’s uprising 
may explain some of the peculiar aspects of the president’s latest 
speech, delivered only days after the passing of The Strengthen-
ing America's Security in the Middle East Act. Rather than em-
phasize victory and moving beyond the war, as he had done in 
earlier speeches, Asad actually proclaimed that Syria was still at 
war, in fact it was now fighting four distinct wars. Perhaps the 
regime is sensing that it was far easier to weaponize the war than 
it is to weaponize the peace. 
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2 
Geo-economics: Russia and Iran in Syria 
 
Faysal Itani 
 
This article examines two dimensions of a broader analysis of 
the geo-economics of reconstruction in Syria: the actions of Iran 
and Russia in the context of their interests and capabilities. The 
analysis identifies overlaps and conflicts among these interests 
and examines the larger geo-economic and geo-political impli-
cations. A comprehensive survey of Iranian and Russian in-
volvement in Syria’s economy is difficult given the scarcity of 
reliable data, but this section captures the essential geoeconomic 
trends involving these two key actors.  
 
 
The Geo-economics of Russian Involvement 
 
A Brief History of Russia in Syria 
In October 2015, Russia entered the Syrian civil war to reverse 
the regime’s deteriorating security situation and ensure its long-
term survival. More broadly, Russia sought to preserve its stra-
tegic posture in the Middle East and end a perceived Western 
regime change campaign. Russia ultimately seeks to translate its 
military gains into a political settlement that would legitimize its 
role and allow it to draw down its military efforts. Russia has 
secured some economic interests in Syria but the profit motive 
appears subordinated to strategic ones, and Russia lacks the 
means or appetite to fund Syria’s reconstruction on a meaningful 
scale. 
The close relationship between Russia and Syria dates back 
to at least the mid-20th century. The USSR had maintained close 
ties with Baathist-led Syria from the 1960s and supported it 
through at least two confrontations with Israel. Soviet arms ex-
ports to Syria reached $825 million1 in 1977, $1 billion in 1978 
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and an average of $2.3 billion per year until 1985. In sum, the 
USSR supplied some $25 billion of military equipment to Syria 
and trained some 10,000 Syrian officers.  
Prior to the civil war, Russia was heavily involved in key 
sectors of the Syrian economy. Political stability and security al-
lowed Russia to pursue profits. Russian companies were im-
portant investors in the oil and gas extraction industries 
throughout the 2000s (the civil war has made this sector far less 
productive and lucrative). Russian investments in infrastructure 
and energy totalled $20 billion in 2008. The Russian energy con-
glomerate Tatneft entered the Syrian market in 2010 by devel-
oping in South Kishamnear Deir-ez-Zor, which is believed to 
contain 4.9 million tons of oil. Soyuzneftegaz, which signed a 
phosphate-mining deal for a site, made investments in energy as 
well. The civil war jeopardized those investment prospects. So-
yuzneftegaz eventually terminated its deal in 2015, and Tatneft 
has suspended its project. 
Yet even before the war, strategic considerations factored 
into the Russian economic calculus in Syria. In addition to 
providing military aid and fiscal support, Russia has forgiven 
Syria’s debt multiple times. In 2005, Russia absolved Syria of 
75 percent, or $14 billion of outstanding debt.  
 
Russian Geo-economics in the Civil War 
Russia is being granted a preferential role in rebuilding Syria’s 
energy and infrastructure sectors. Preferential access to hydro-
carbons reserves is just as valuable for the geopolitical leverage 
they provide in a political settlement and indeed in post-war 
Syria. In 2015, the executive director for the Russia Union of Oil 
and Gas Producers, Gissa Gutchel, announced that Russian busi-
nesses would quickly fulfill contracts and resume operations in 
this sector totalling $1.6 billion once the situation in Syria had 
stabilized. On March 2018, Russia’s Energy Minister Alexander 
Novak signed a cooperation agreement with his Syrian counter-
part on oil and gas production. It “implies the participation of 
Russian companies in Syrian projects, and the negotiations are 
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conducted on a regular basis,” said Victor Khaikov, president of 
Russia’s National Association of Oil and Gas Service. Khaikob 
highlighted Russian participation would be profitable as well. 
For its part, the Syrian regime is energetically wooing Rus-
sian investment in energy. In February 2016, a Syrian repre-
sentative travelled to Moscow to meet with the Minister of 
Energy and the heads of the petroleum industry and requested 
that Russian oil and gas companies help restore Syria’s de-
stroyed energy sector. Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid 
Muallem stated Syria would allow “all possible incentives” to 
companies participating in the reconstruction. In July 2017, the 
Syrian government offered 25 percent of profits from oil and gas 
fields captured from the Islamic State to Evro Polis, a Russian 
military contractor allegedly owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a 
Russian businessman close to President Vladimir Putin. 
During the war the Syrian government has signed several 
large military contracts with Russia; a pro-Russian newspaper 
reported that the two countries signed a $550 million deal in De-
cember 2011 for the delivery of 36 Yakovlev Yak-130 Mitten 
combat trainers. The active parts of the arms contracts had, in 
2012, an estimated value of $4.5 billion. Between 75 and 90 per-
cent of new arms purchased by Syria in this period were Russian-
made. That year, one quarter of the weapons produced in Russia 
between 2005 and 2009 were exported to Syria. 
In its drive to de-escalate its own military efforts, Russia is 
likely to prioritize the reconstruction of state security services 
and army institutions. This simultaneously boosts the legitimacy 
of its ally the regime, helps the latter impose and enforce local 
settlements that preserve regime sovereignty, and eases the op-
erational burden on the Russian military. Indeed a political 
agreement with the opposition is acceptable or even desirable for 
Russia insofar as it recognizes regime superiority, but that de-
pends on the regime retaining indefinite military superiority 
given its continued unpopularity among much of the population. 
Because rebuilding core infrastructure is of strategic im-
portance to the regime, it is a likely target of Russian support. 
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Russia’s entry into the Syrian civil war was accompanied by a 
simultaneous commitment to assisting in certain infrastructure 
projects. Russian objectives have included regaining access to 
key roads and linking this infrastructure. Pro-Russian media out-
let Russia Today reported that Syrian Prime Minister Wael al-
Khalqi stated, “The Russian side has responded to the idea of 
restoring [Syrian] infrastructure. Therefore, a lot of deals were 
signed, including $675 million and $280 million agreements.” In 
2017, Russia signed a forty-nine year lease in Tartus to upgrade 
a serviceable naval base near the coastal city. Allegedly, plans 
for Russian forces to further expand infrastructure in Tartus and 
Hmeimim are underway.  
In February 2018, the Russia Chamber of Commerce held a 
Russia-Syria business forum to discuss opportunities with Syria 
at a time when the war seems to be going in the regime’s favor. 
At the forum, the Syrian-Russian Business Council claimed to 
have “established contact,” and that a number of unspecified 
contracts have already been implemented. The Syrian govern-
ment attended and sought Russian investment in twenty-six pro-
jects. These included a planned rail line linking the Syrian 
capital to its airport, industrial plants producing a range of out-
puts from cement to yeast and tyres, and power generation pro-
jects in Homs. In any case, the Russian Chamber of Commerce’s 
President made clear that “first priority will, as President Bashar 
al-Assad has said, be given to Russian businesses.” 
Russia printed currency to support the Syrian government 
in 2012, initially to pay off the Syrian state’s growing budget 
amid its initiative to create state jobs and maintain subsidies dur-
ing the civil war. Russia has also assisted in stabilizing govern-
ment revenues. According to the Jamestown Foundation, “Under 
Russian Ministry of Finance supervision, the production of cur-
rency [...] went through a logistic chain of both Syrian and Rus-
sian cargo carriers that transported over 200 tons of currency in 
a ten-week period to the Syrian government with a continuous 
flow of currency as needed to prop up the Syrian economy.” 
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Implications 
Despite fiscal support, promised investments, and close rela-
tions, it would be incorrect to assess Russian geoeconomic ac-
tivity (current and prospective) as ‘reconstruction’ in the 
development sense. Russia lacks the financial means to shoulder 
a substantial portion of the hundreds of billions of dollars in es-
timated reconstruction costs. More importantly it does not prior-
itize ‘rebuilding’ Syria but rather ensuring regime survival, 
gaining geopolitical leverage, and exploiting certain lucrative 
and/or strategic sectors. Reconstruction would offer geopolitical 
leverage of course, but Russia can generate leverage through 
diplomatic and military action.  
When it comes to reconstruction as development, Russia 
aims to shift the financial burden to Europe and international 
agencies. In turn, it will likely hold out the promise to facilitate 
the return of hundreds of thousands of (Muslim) Syrian refugees. 
While this would benefit the West and generate international 
goodwill or at least respect for Russian influence, the Syrian 
government has a say in this and may be less eager to reabsorb 
millions of potentially hostile and certainly needy people. The 
most likely trajectory of Russia involvement amid Syria’s isola-
tion will therefore be targeted investment that secures some of 
its commercial and strategic interests and preserves core regime 
military capabilities to the degree possible.   
Russia shares with Iran the focus on securing regime sur-
vival. So long as that hung in the balance (2011-2016) this con-
vergence of interests was enough to keep differences at bay. As 
the regime’s military situation has stabilized however, the ques-
tion of what ought to follow highlights some differences be-
tween Russia and Iran over geoeconomic priorities and 
strategies.  
 
 
The Geo-economics of Iranian Involvement 
 
A Brief History of Iran in Syria 
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The Iranian-Syrian strategic relationship dates back to the rule 
of Hafez Assad in the 1970s, based in large part on shared hos-
tility toward Israel and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Under Bashar 
Assad, this relationship deepened in opposition to the United 
States and Saudi Arabia and support for the Lebanese militia 
Hezbollah. Bilateral trade between Iran and Syria reached its 
peak in 2010 at $545 million, with Syrian exports to Iran ac-
counting for 30 percent of the figure.  
Despite this, Iran’s core interests in Syria are largely secu-
rity-focused. Iran entered the Syrian civil war to preserve Hez-
bollah’s strategic posture vis a vis Israel. Iran calculated that 
Bashar Assad’s fall would threaten supply lines to and the stra-
tegic depth of Hezbollah, as Iran expected a hostile, Sunni-led 
regime to replace it. More broadly, Iran did not want a Sunni-
led, Saudi or US-aligned Syria to emerge in the Levant. 
Iran entered the civil war in its early stages, largely in a mil-
itary advisory capacity and by building up and deploying proxies 
against rebel forces. It too sought to ensure the regime’s survival, 
but for historical reasons the Iranians’ institutional relationship 
with the regime was less comfortable than Russia’s, and its 
standing in Sunni Arab Syrian society is complicated by its Per-
sian and radical Shia character. Yet because the Iranian regime 
relied largely on local Syrian (and Lebanese) proxies to fight and 
control territory, it developed an entrenched military and in-
creasingly social presence on the ground. Iran’s involvement is 
therefore simultaneously more intimate and more alien than Rus-
sia’s. 
 
Iranian Geo-economics in the Syrian Civil War 
Iranian geo-economic strategy is shaped by two factors: military 
priorities relating to the security of Hezbollah and the posture 
against Israel; and political-economy considerations favoring 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The former 
will require securing sensitive land and transport rights or direct 
control, shaping Iran’s economic choices. Meanwhile the IRGC 
will likely be the main beneficiaries of many Iranian activities, 
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and is likely to crowd out competition from the Iranian private 
sector or civilian institutions. Despite its deeper military in-
volvement and presence however, an increasingly-isolated Iran 
is at an economic disadvantage to Russia and China with their 
superior resources and closer integration into the global econ-
omy. Still, its crucial important to the regime war effort has 
granted it multiple economic opportunities. 
Iran and Syria signed a series of agreements that were an-
nounced throughout 2017, including opportunities for Iran to ob-
tain and build a mobile service network. The IRGC owns much 
of Iran’s telecoms sector after it bought 50 percent-plus-one 
share in the state telecoms company in 2009. In September 2017, 
Iran announced it will build power plants in the coastal province 
of Latakia with a capacity of 540 megawatts. In a separate mem-
orandum, Iran also committed to a project to reconstruct a 90-
megawatt plant in Deir Ezzor. In the same agreement, five gas-
fired power plants will be moved to Syria’s northwestern city of 
Aleppo; the Mapna Group, an Iranian enterprise with possible 
IRGC ties, will implement the 130-million-euro project.  
While these agreements granted Iran large economic con-
tracts in Syrian telecommunications, electricity, and phosphate 
mining sectors, other sectors including real estate are also in-
volved. Syria plans to give Iran 5,000 hectares of land for farm-
ing and 1,000 hectares for setting up oil and gas terminals, 
according to Iran’s state news agency IRNA. At a news confer-
ence in early 2018, a senior official of Iran’s Research Center of 
Petroleum Industry revealed that Iran and Venezuela would con-
struct oil refineries in Syria, an investment worth approximately 
$1 billion. Again, the main beneficiary of this project would be 
the IRGC.  
On August 2018, Iranian economic delegation headed by 
Iran’s Deputy Minister of Roads and Urban Development Amir 
Amini visited Damascus for talks on a long-term economic part-
nership agreement between the two countries. The details have 
not been disclosed. Director of the ministry’s International Af-
fairs department Teymour Bashir Gonbadi has stated Iranian 
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companies will be involved in reconstructing Syria’s transporta-
tion infrastructure and building 30,000 homes in the country. 
Gondadi also Iran plans to establish a railway connection be-
tween Iran and Syria via Iraq, saying that now is an opportune 
time, given China’s desire to secure railroad access to the Med-
iterranean within the framework of its Belt & Road Initiative 
(BRI). 
One particularly contentious activity has been Iran’s acqui-
sition of Syrian land for strategic and religious purposes. Iranian 
media has confirmed the purchases of land in parts of Syria. The 
purchases are reported to be in the Sayyida Zaynab suburb of 
Damascus, where a prominent Shia shrine exists, and the Old 
Town of Damascus, although the latter report is less clear. The 
head of the Iranian Department of Reconstruction of Holy 
Shrines has quoted saying, “the urban planning of the area near 
Sayyeda Zaynab is to be revised. A new model is being prepared 
now and we are buying the properties around the shrine.” Un-
confirmed reports have circulated around Iranian land purchases 
in the Mazzeh district around the Iranian Embassy, in the Bahsa 
area near the Iranian Cultural Centre, and areas in the strategic 
city of Homs. 
Separate from any civilian or commercial efforts, Iran re-
portedly is building a permanent military base 8 miles south of 
Damascus. Satellite images commissioned by the BBC seem to 
show construction activity at the site between January and Octo-
ber of 2017. Analysts believe that these efforts showcase Iran’s 
willingness to fill gaps in regime security, in a geography that is 
of critical importance to Iran and Hezbollah. This is obviously 
not reconstruction but still a reflection of Iranian resource-allo-
cation and therefore priorities.  
 
 
The Larger Picture 
Iranian and Russian interests align over the Syrian regime’s se-
curity, but diverge over post-war Syria’s character and place in 
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the international order. Russia seeks to consolidate and interna-
tionally legitimize the post-war order so as to draw down its mil-
itary and attract foreign funding and reconstruction, securing the 
regime’s long-term future. Iran seeks to entrench itself militarily 
against Israel with little regard for international repercussions - 
a goal that is at odds if not completely incompatible with reinte-
grating the regime into the global order and attracting recon-
struction funding. Even as Iran establishes a more robust anti-
Israel posture in Syria and enriches the most important player in 
its political economy, the IRGC, Russia projects the message 
that the Syrian conflict is over and normalization is on offer, in 
exchange for international development funds and support. 
There is a tension in both countries’ geo-economic strategy: 
the IRGC’s commercial interests are at odds with the heightened 
risk of large-scale conflict with Israel in Syria (the result of 
Iran’s continuing military buildup in Syrian territory). Any Is-
raeli-Iranian war in Syria is likely to further set the Syrian regime 
back economically, along with any IRGC economic opportuni-
ties. Russia’s geo-economic challenge is to revitalize an econ-
omy in territory governed by an international pariah state and an 
isolated foreign government. It is perhaps Russia that has the 
more ambitious and therefore more difficult task. 
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 4 
The Geopolitics Of Syria’s Reconstruc-
tion: A Case Of Matryoshka 
 
ERWIN VAN VEEN 
 
 
Abstract 
The supply of, and demand for, the reconstruction of Syria is grossly 
mismatched in both focus and volume. This essay examines whether 
Russia, the United States, the European Union, Iran, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Israel are likely to close, maintain or increase this gap. 
Such an examination helps assess the prospects for Syria’s future sta-
bility. In the final analysis, the combination of the variable global in-
terests of the US (war on terror, anti-Iran) and Russia (re-establishing 
great power status, keeping Syria on its side) with the regional conflict 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran makes the reconstruction of Syria hos-
tage to irreconcilable agendas given the country’s association with 
Iran. Potential intermediaries like Turkey and the EU will not engage 
in countrywide reconstruction at this point. Turkey suffers from do-
mestic turmoil and radical shifts in its foreign policy that have ren-
dered it ineffective, while the EU’s foreign policy indecisiveness has 
relegated it to the sidelines. Israel was never going to engage directly 
in Syria’s reconstruction but also finds itself without political influ-
ence other than the one-trick pony of its regular airstrikes. The result 
is that the reconstruction of Syria will be fragmented, incomplete and 
focused on the immediate interests of the regime, Russia and Iran, with 
attendant negative consequences for the livelihood prospects of the av-
erage Syrian in the short to medium term. There is an urgent need for 
detailed scenario-planning that explores the long-term consequences 
of this state of play – for the Syrian regime, for the Syrian population, 
for Syria’s neighbours and beyond. 
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Introduction 
The war in Syria has easily been the most violent and ruinous 
internationalised civil war of the 21st century so far.1 Its esti-
mated 370,000–570,000 casualties, c. 5.6 million refugees and 
c. 6.6 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), along with its 
reconstruction bill of over US$250 billion, underpin this claim,2 
as do credible narratives describing the scale of abuse carried out 
by the Syrian regime against the country’s civilian population.3 
While the Assad regime tries to give the impression that normal-
ity has returned to large parts of Syria,4 it will actually be dec-
ades before the wounds created by this conflict have ‘healed’ in 
terms of trauma, frayed societal tissue and depleted social capi-
tal. 
Beyond such appalling carnage and destruction, the Syrian 
civil war is also highly relevant from a geopolitical perspective. 
Not only is it the place where both the hope and repression of 
the Arab Uprisings continue to reverberate, it is also a (proxy) 
battleground for various regional and global power competitions 
that have superimposed themselves on the drivers of local con-
flict. As a result, the conflict’s key drivers, as well as the possi-
bilities for its resolution, lie largely outside of Syria. At the 
diplomatic level, there is the moribund, Syrian-focused Geneva 
peace process run by the UN and the faster-paced Astana and 
                                                     
1 I am grateful for the review of this essay by Samar Batrawi (research fel-
low at Clingendael) and Hamidreza Azizi (assistant professor at Shahid Be-
heshti University in Iran). Its contents remain my own responsibility. 
2 Data are taken from http://www.syriahr.com/en/; https://data2.un-
hcr.org/en/situations/syria (accessed 18 March 2019); World Bank Group, 
The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Consequences of the Conflict in 
Syria, Washington DC: WBG, 2017. Note that conflict casualty figures are 
notoriously unreliable as they are prone to both over- and underreporting. 
3 De Silva, D. et al. (2014), Report into the credibility of certain evidence 
with regard to torture and execution of persons incarcerated by the current 
Syrian regime (‘Caesar report’), London: online (accessed 30 September 
2018).     
4 For example, SANA (the Syrian Arab News Agency) reported the 2017 
Damascus International Fair to ‘have succeeded beyond expectations’ to 
demonstrate that Syria ‘is open for business’. 
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Sochi peace processes, which are Turkish/Iranian/Russian-oper-
ated.5 At the military level, there is the largely impotent Syrian 
Arab Army (SAA) on the one hand, and the Russian air force 
and Iran-affiliated forces on the other.6 Finally, Syria’s location 
as an intersection between Africa, Europe and Asia and between 
Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran makes it both a participant 
in, and victim of, proxy warfare, refugees, radicalism and crime. 
All of this ensures that any political settlement emerging from 
its ruins will project a long shadow, commanding ongoing inter-
est from its neighbours. 
It is from this perspective that the essay explores how the 
interests of key foreign state actors in the Syrian conflict will 
help or hinder the nature, comprehensiveness and speed of re-
construction in those parts of the country under the control of 
President Assad.7 Currently, the supply of and demand for re-
construction are grossly mismatched in both focus and volume.8 
                                                     
5 While none of these peace processes have so far been conclusive, the con-
trast between four Geneva conferences on the one hand and eight ‘Astana 
talks’ and one conference in Sochi on the other, suggest that the Astana-So-
chi track is more active. It is not necessarily more inclusive. Some of its 
meetings are tripartite consultations between Russia, Iran and Turkey about 
Syria. 
6 See for example: Keen, D., Syria: Playing into their hands, London: Saf-
erworld, 2017; Vatanka, A., Iran’s use of Shi’i militant proxies, Washington 
DC: Middle East Institute, Policy Paper 2018-5, 2018; Steinberg, G., Die 
shiitische internationale, Berlin: SWP, 2018. Also consider, more specifi-
cally, the interventions by Hezbollah (2012), Iran (2013), Russia (2015) and 
support from various Gulf countries (2011/12-2017), as well as interven-
tions by Turkey (2016, 2017 and 2018), France (2016) and the US (2017). 
7 The essay considers ‘states’ in neo-realist fashion. It does not examine dif-
ferent decision-making centres within states but views them as unitary ac-
tors. This is an abstraction of reality permissible to the extent that it helps 
understand the main motivations of the key state protagonists in the Syrian 
civil war. 
8 Simply put, the sums needed for reconstruction are large (upwards of 
US$250 billion), Syria’s business elite is unable to mobilise this kind of 
money in the face of current Western sanctions, Syria’s international allies 
(Russia, Iran) are also in all likelihood unable to contribute such resources 
while Western countries are unwilling to do so. The Gulf countries are an 
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A better understanding of the probable role of foreign state ac-
tors – in particular the US, Russia, the EU, Iran, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Israel – in decreasing, maintaining or increasing this 
gap will help assess the prospects for Syria’s stability. In terms 
of closing the gap between supply and demand for reconstruc-
tion efforts, foreign state actors can allocate funds directly to 
Syrian reconstruction in the form of aid and concessional lend-
ing, or indirectly by providing incentives for private businesses 
in their own jurisdictions to engage. 
 
 
Syria as battlefield of global geopolitics 
It is commonplace to view the Syrian conflict at least in part as 
yet another site of US-Russian contestation, but this risks funda-
mental misrepresentation of the situation. After all, the US has 
not been an effective party to the original Syrian conflict (the 
uprising against President Assad), and neither does it view Rus-
sia as a global peer.9 Instead, US interests have centred on the 
                                                     
alternative source of funding and have been making tentative moves to-
wards an accommodation with President Assad (e.g. Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates are at various stages of reopening their embassies in Damas-
cus). Yet, the overarching Saudi-Iranian tensions make it unlikely that sig-
nificant reconstruction finance will be forthcoming soon other than what is 
needed to normalise relations, or perhaps in economic sectors that are of 
strategic relevance to the Gulf. On the ‘old’ and ‘new’ guard of Syria’s busi-
ness elite see: Rabat, L., Who will rebuild Syria: Extremely loud and incred-
ibly close, Modern Diplomacy, online, 2019. On Western attitudes towards 
reconstruction see: https://www.presstv.com/De-
tail/2019/03/17/591288/Syria-reconstruction-US-UK-France-statement (ac-
cessed 18 March 2019). Also consider the ‘No Assistance to Assad Act’ that 
is under review in the US Congress and Senate: https://www.con-
gress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4681 (accessed 18 March 2018). 
Finally: Batrawi, S. (2018), Drivers of urban reconstruction in Syria: 
power, privilege and profit extraction, The Hague: Clingendael. 
9 See: Hamidi, I., ‘Syria at a crossroads: ‘A peace to end all peace?’, Turkish 
policy quarterly, Fall 2017; Van Dam, N., Destroying a nation: The civil 
war in Syria, London: IB Taurus, 2017; Price, B., ‘Syria: A wicked problem 
for all’, CTC Sentinel, Special Issue, Vol. 6, Issue 8, August 2013; Lo, B., 
Russia and the new world disorder, London: Chatham House, 2015. 
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defeat of Islamic State (IS) and countering Iran’s growing influ-
ence in the Middle East.10 As a consequence, only part of the US 
vs. Russia framework has analytical usefulness, namely the ob-
servation that Russia views and uses the conflict in Syria as part 
of its strategy to reassert itself as a global power on a par with 
the US.11  
Understanding the 2015 Russian intervention in the Syrian 
conflict requires a brief examination of the gap that the previous 
25 years created between the Kremlin’s self-perception as a 
great power and its treatment as a second-rate power by most 
Western countries throughout the 1990s and 2000s.12 NATO se-
curity expansion, EU economic expansion and Western political 
marginalisation during a period of Russian political-economic 
upheaval and weakness created a nationalist revanchism that was 
further aggravated by NATO’s perceived abuse of UN Security 
Council Resolution No. 1973 to topple the Libyan regime of 
Colonel Kaddafi (2011) and the EU’s efforts to draw Ukraine 
firmly into its economic orbit through the EU-Ukraine Associa-
tion Agreement (2014). Throughout the same period, the Krem-
lin gradually re-established its control over the Russian state 
apparatus, modernised its military and stabilised its economy 
through Kremlin-centred crony capitalist networks, heavy reli-
ance on natural resources, and some economic diversification to-
wards Asia.13 The result is a new Russian foreign policy 
assertiveness that pursues two core strategic interests. First, if 
Russia cares about an issue, it expects to be part of the group of 
states politically deciding it. Second, it calls the shots in the for-
mer Soviet space, albeit on the understanding that old-fashioned, 
                                                     
10 Alaaldin, R.; Fritz, J., S Heydemann et al, A 10-degree shift in Syria strat-
egy, Washington DC: Brookings, 2018; Barnes-Dacey, J., E. Geranmayeh, 
H. Lovatt, The Middle East’s new battle lines, London: ECFR, 2018. 
11 Lo (2015), op.cit.; Rodkiewicz, ‘Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy: Re-
gional ambitions, global objections’, OSW Studies No. 71, 2017. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Judah, B., Fragile empire: How Russia fell in and out of love with Vladi-
mir Putin, New Haven: YUP, 2014; Lo (2015), op.cit. 
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total USSR dominance has been replaced by a more complex and 
variable web of economic, military and social ties.14  
From this perspective, the Syrian conflict is at least in part 
a Russian gambit to re-establish its influence as a key player in 
the great power concert that manages today’s multipolarity.15 It 
is not necessarily the case that Russia’s intervention was proac-
tively planned with such an objective in mind. In fact, it may 
well have been the immediate threat against its access to the 
Mediterranean port of Tartus, the imminent overthrow of the 
Syrian regime as a Russian ally, or even the Iranian request for 
help that triggered the involvement of Russia’s armed forces in 
2015. But all of this needs to be seen in the broader context of 
‘revanchism’ and great power re-establishment outlined above. 
In short, the exact chain and sequence of motivations and actions 
arguably matters less than the underlying foreign policy outlook. 
If this assessment of Russia’s Syrian gambit is correct, it 
makes ensuring the survival of President Assad himself and 
blocking a more US-oriented resolution of the conflict mostly a 
means to an end.16 Russia’s efforts since 2015 to detach Turkey 
as much as possible from its Western moorings should also be 
seen as an opportunistic move that both plays into its global 
agenda and serves to increase its regional room for manoeuver.17 
While the jury is still out on this last stratagem, it is clear that 
Ankara has substantially increased its foreign policy autonomy 
vis-à-vis the US on issues such as the purchase of the S-400 air 
defence system, the Syrian Kurds, and its relations with Iran. 
The stated objective of Russia’s intervention in Syria ‘to defeat 
                                                     
14 Ibid.  
15 For a broader assessment of Russia’s foreign policy objectives in the Mid-
dle East, which prominently includes its quest for great power status in its 
confrontation with the West: Kozhanov, N., Russian policy across the Mid-
dle East: Motivation and methods, London: Chatham House, 2018. 
16 Trenin, D., ‘What drives Russia’s policy in the Middle East?’, in: 
Popescu, N. and Secrieru S., ‘Russia’s return to the Middle East: Building 
sandcastles?’, EU ISS Chaillot papers, No, 146, July 2018. 
17 Rodwiezicz (2017), op.cit. Note that Turkey-EU relations were already 
troubled before the Syrian conflict. 
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terrorism’ must, on inspection of the evidence, be almost wholly 
considered an international smokescreen.18  
In the pursuit of its ‘real’ objectives, Russia has consistently 
applied an adroit mix of classic foreign policy instruments, i.e. 
diplomatic pressure (initially via the UN Security Council and 
later via the Astana/Sochi peace processes) and high-powered 
expeditionary military force.19 This allowed it to notch up two 
key political results: 1) veto power in determining the progress 
of the conflict as Syrian regime offensives are not possible with-
out Russian (air) support, and 2) a new set of pragmatic relations 
with Turkey, Iran and even Israel that puts Russia at the centre 
of regional diplomacy and, in consequence, of any conflict res-
olution framework for the Syrian civil war.  
While there is little evidence that Russia’s intervention has 
re-established it in the premier league of great powers, this ob-
jective could still be satisfied by it being a key player in deliver-
ing an internationally accepted resolution to the Syrian conflict. 
While it is essential for the sustainability of such a resolution 
that the reconstruction of Syria is taken in hand, this does not 
necessarily require a significant contribution from Russia. It 
would be enough if others pick up the reconstruction bill, and 
this is an area of focus for Russian at the moment.20 This is be-
                                                     
18 See for instance: Gaub, F., ‘Russia’s non-war on Daesh’, in: Popescu and 
Secrieru (2018), op.cit.; Bellingcat online reporting on targets of Russian 
airstrikes (accessed 13 October 2018). While there is a connection in the 
form of Chechen fighters among Syria’s opposition, the Kremlin’s effective 
suppression of militant Islamism in the second Chechen war and Kadyrov’s 
iron fisted rule since indicate that Russia has good domestic control over its 
‘terrorist challenges’, despite the continuation of a low-level insurgency in 
the northern Caucasus. 
19 Kaim, M. and O. Tamminga, ‘Russia’s military intervention in Syria’, 
SWP Comment, No. 48, 2015; Delanoë, I., What Russia gained from its mili-
tary intervention in Syria, Orient XXI, 2018, Online (accessed 13 October 
2018). On its sustainability: Secrieru, S., ‘The real and hidden costs of Rus-
sia’s foreign policy’, EU ISS Issue Briefs, No. 2, 2018. 
20 See for example Bloomberg Online on 12 October 2018 (accessed 13 Oc-
tober 2018). 
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cause ensuring minimal stability in post-conflict Syria and main-
taining a meaningful state-centric model of Russian-Syrian co-
operation requires the re-establishment of the Syrian state with 
at least core capabilities. This, in turn, demands some degree of 
state-led reconstruction for which external funds are required. 
Secondly, Western assistance for reconstruction would essen-
tially prove Russia right and confer legitimacy on its interven-
tion by recognising that President Assad was the only option to 
win the fight again ‘terrorism’. It goes without saying that the 
Syrian-state-to-be-reconstituted would be centralised in nature 
and revert to its pre-2011 crony capitalist practices, in line with 
the regime’s and Russia’s preferences.21 Any financial contribu-
tion of Russia itself is likely to be limited to Syria’s oil and gas 
industry which, as it happens, is also the only economic sector 
that can turn a profit in the short term (regional pipeline politics, 
in particular, being important).22 
In sum, Russia has an appreciable interest in Syria’s recon-
struction, provided it is state-led and state-focused. It may be 
prepared to negotiate with the Syrian regime to extract political 
concessions that fall short of meaningful change in exchange for 
financial reconstruction contributions from other countries. It 
should be kept in mind, however, that Russia’s ability to extract 
such concessions from the regime is limited and likely to decline 
                                                     
21 Batrawi, S. and N. Grinstead, Six scenarios for pro-regime militias in 
‘post-war’ Syria, The Hague: Clingendael, 2019; see also: Khatib, L. and L. 
Sinjab, Syria’s transactional state: How the conflict changed the Syrian 
state’s exercise of power, London: Chatham House, 2018. 
22 In January 2018, President Assad gave Russia the sole rights to oil and 
gas production in Syria. See: http://theconversation.com/armed-by-the-
kremlin-gazprom-could-be-the-new-force-in-syria-when-the-troops-leave-
101492 (accessed 18 March 2019). A sustained presence of Russian energy 
companies implies, incidentally, a permanent Russian military presence in 
the form of ‘company forces’ to protect key facilities. The trouble today is 
that a number of key oil and gas fields are located in areas occupied by the 
non-regime-aligned Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). 
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once the guns fall silent and its use to the Syrian regime de-
creases.23  
 
From uninterested to weak: The US, the EU, and the Syrian conflict  
The lack of US engagement with the original Syrian conflict, its 
half-hearted policies, and the complete absence of an effective 
EU approach to the conflict enabled Russian successes and re-
duced the West’s options for dealing with Syria’s reconstruction. 
Despite having a significant interest in a stable and democratic 
Syria, the EU is currently relegated to financing a significant part 
of the cost of hosting Syria’s more than 5 million refugees in the 
region through its compacts while at the same time lacking po-
litical influence or even channels of diplomatic communication 
with the Syrian regime.24 Its sanctions, support for accountabil-
ity-for-war-crimes initiatives and feeble military actions – such 
as British and Dutch support for armed opposition groups and 
French forces active in northern Syria – have meanwhile put it 
on the regime’s blacklist. That it is not completely without influ-
ence is only because of the reconstruction finance it could po-
tentially contribute. Yet, given the Assad regime’s re-
entrenchment, which is already underway, and its crony capital-
ist economic policies from before 2011, it is highly doubtful that 
a sufficiently fine-grained implementation modality can be 
found that prevents regime capture of European reconstruction 
support.25  
                                                     
23 The extent to which the many pro-regime militias will, or will not, be ef-
fectively integrated into the SAA is an important indicator of Russian lever-
age as such integration is a precondition for re-establishing an effective state 
and runs counter to Iran’s preferences for a more pluriform security sector 
akin to Lebanon or Iraq. Batrawi and Grinstead (2019), op.cit. 
24 See for example the co-chair’s declaration of the Brussels III Conference 
on 'Supporting the future of Syria and the region', online, 14 March 2019; 
Uzelac, A., O. Macharis and E. van Veen, It’s there to stay: A big idea for a 
better response to Syrian displacement, The Hague: Clingendael, online, 
2019.  
25 On the political-economic structure of the Assad regime: Hadidi, S., Z. 
Majed and F. Mardam-Bey, Dans la tête de Bachar al-Assad, Paris: Actes 
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Successive US-administrations viewed the Syrian conflict 
predominantly through the prism of the war-on-terror (after 
2014) and, later, as a regional conflict involving Iran (especially 
after January 2017 when President Trump was inaugurated). The 
war-on-terror frame shifted the US focus from its limited efforts 
to oppose dictatorship to a military campaign aimed at eliminat-
ing IS. While it is not exactly clear what core US security interest 
IS threatened given its focus on the ‘near enemy’, its presence in 
Iraq, combined with the entrenched nature of the 9/11 anti-terror 
paradigm in US political circles, proved sufficient. The US-led 
coalition has been effective in rolling back IS territorial control, 
but it has made little progress in addressing its root causes such 
as Sunni marginalisation in Iraq and dictatorship in Syria.  
Paradoxically, the military focus on defeating IS caused the 
US to provide significant support for the Syrian Kurds,26 with 
the side effect of facilitating Russia’s efforts to broaden the gap 
between Turkey and its Western allies (Turkey views the Syrian 
Democratic Union Party (PYD) as part of the Turkish PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party), and considers both terrorist organi-
sations). Despite President Trump’s recent announcement of the 
complete withdrawal of US troops from northeastern Syria, the 
subsequent pushback from the US foreign policy establishment 
might ensure a continuous US presence in the area after all.27 
Yet, as it has become clear that Turkey prioritises perceived re-
gional security threats over its relations with the US and its po-
sition in NATO, maintaining even a diminished US-military 
footprint in northeastern Syria will keep Turkey on edge and 
                                                     
Sud, 2018; for thoughts on how European reconstruction support could be 
organized: Decina, A., How should the West play a weak hand in Syria re-
construction?, War on the Rocks, online, 2019; on continuities and ruptures 
in regime methods of rule: Khatib and Sinjab (2018), op.cit. 
26 This mostly concerns the PYD and its associated militias (YPG and YPJ). 
See also: Van Veen, E., ‘Uit de as herrijzend: Syrië en de Koerdische 
kwestie [Rising from the ashes: Syria and the Kurdish question]’, Clingen-
dael Spectator, Vol. 72, Issue 5, 2018. 
27 Commentary abounds on President Trump’s decision. For instance: Pi-
erini, M., The politics of pandemonium, Carnegie Diwan, online, 2019. 
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nourish its new relationship with Russia. In this sense, US policy 
towards northeastern Syria was, and remains, stuck between a 
rock and a hard place. Given the poor state of American-Turkish 
relations and the current obsession of the US administration with 
Iran, it is conceivable that the US will continue to engage in re-
construction-like efforts in Syria’s northeast under the guise of 
‘stabilisation’. This might even happen in the framework of a 
deal between Damascus and Syria’s Kurds.28 
Meanwhile, US confrontation with Iran intensifies by the 
day and shows little sign of abating. The scope and intrusiveness 
of US conditions for re-engagement29 are such that Iran is bound 
to feel vindicated about its intervention in Syria as part of its so-
called ‘forward defence’ strategy.30 It is evident that Iran seeks 
to maintain appreciable strategic influence in Syria via expan-
sion of its economic interests (e.g. transportation, railroads, 
housing) and by loosely integrating some of the forces it spon-
sors into Syria’s reconfigured security sector.31 These elements 
would both embody and enable a regional approach that consol-
idates Iranian influence beyond purely military elements.32  
 
The US appears to be banking on Syria´s weakness and recon-
struction needs further draining Iranian resources. Should this 
increase the level of protest in Iran about the cost of its foreign 
policy actions while sanctions start to bite, the US would have 
                                                     
28 Burcher, E., Has the US given up on stabilization efforts in Syria?, Atlan-
tic Council, online, 2018. 
29 For instance: Pompeo, M., After the deal: A new Iran strategy, Remarks 
at the Heritage Foundation, 21 May 2018. 
30 For an excellent analysis of the evolution of Iran’s Syria strategy and its 
underlying foreign policy interests: Ahmadian, H. and P. Mohseni, ‘Iran’s 
Syria strategy: The evolution of deterrence’, International Affairs, 95:2, 
2019; also: International Crisis Group, Iran’s priorities in a turbulent Mid-
dle East, Brussels: ICG, 2018a. 
31 Azizi, H., Iran eyes major role in Syria via reconstruction, Al-Monitor, 
online, 2018; Batrawi and Grinstead (2019), op.cit. 
32 Azizi, H., What Rouhani´s visit to Iraq tells us about Iran´s Syria policy, 
Al-Monitor, online, 2019. 
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achieved one of the aims of its sanctions policy. However, on 
balance this is unlikely as the growing anti-US stance of the Ira-
nian population is likely to outweigh its dissatisfaction with its 
leadership’s economic policies. It should also be taken into ac-
count that the Iranian security services maintain a firm grip on 
both society and the economy.33 It is more likely that Iran will 
stimulate its businesses to engage in the reconstruction of Syria 
on commercial terms rather than providing greater state re-
sources for reconstruction efforts, thus expanding its influence 
and potentially recouping some of its investments.34 To make 
this possible, the Iranian government could seek to entice greater 
Chinese investment in Iran, Iraq and Syria by offering to 
strengthen the Middle Eastern corridor of the Belt and Road In-
itiative towards Europe.35 In the medium term, such an approach 
could help Iran cope with the negative effects of US sanctions 
although BRI benefits present a double-edged sword to Iran as 
they would further increase its already significant economic de-
pendence on China.36 Moreover, the growing caution about Chi-
nese investment in Europe might yet throw a spanner in the 
                                                     
33 See for instance: Wright, R., Iran celebrates the revolution’s fortieth an-
niversary: Twelve blocks from the White House, The New Yorker, online, 
2019. This is not to say there are no risks to stability in Iran, such as the new 
sense of political agency of Iran’s lower classes acquired through the pro-
tests of December 2017/January 2018. On this topic: Khian, A., La révolte 
des pauvres ébranle le régime en Iran, Orient XXI, online, 2018. Yet, sev-
eral interviews by the author in Tehran in January 2019 suggested that the 
Iranian government is capable of handling such protests without too much 
repression and that the middle classes fear the instability that would come 
with protracted protests.  
34 Note that Iran’s leaders were concerned about mission creep from the on-
set of their involvement in the Syrian conflict, which also makes it less 
likely for state-funding for Syria’s reconstruction to be forthcoming. ICG 
(2018a), op.cit. Furthermore, many Iranian enterprises have links to the Ira-
nian Revolutionary Guard Corps.  
35 Azizi (2018), op.cit. 
36 Shariatinia, M. and H. Azizi, ‘Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative: Amid 
Hope and Fear’, Journal of Contemporary China, online, 2019. 
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works by closing parts of the EU market to Chinese business ac-
tivity.37 
 
 
Syria as a pawn on the regional political chessboard 
It is the combination of the global and regional dimensions of 
the Syrian conflict that makes it difficult to resolve via interna-
tional diplomacy. The conflict’s regional dimension centres on 
Iranian-Saudi competition across the Middle East, including 
Syria, with Turkey and Israel acting as bit players specific to the 
Syrian theatre. For a brief moment, the regional powers per-
ceived the Syrian conflict through the lens of the Arab Uprisings. 
It is worth recalling that significant parts of the Iranian foreign 
policy elite as well as its population initially sympathized with 
the Syrian opposition in their rebellion against President Assad’s 
autocracy in a situation not dissimilar from their own revolt 
against the Shah in 1979.38  
In contrast, the Saudis’ initially supported President Assad 
as fellow autocrat and out of fear for further revolutionary 
change in the region. In parallel, the Saudi monarchy had been 
concerned about growing Iranian dominance in Iraq since 2003. 
In 2011, these fears were deepened by US ‘betrayal’ – as per-
ceived by the House of Saud – of common allies such as Egypt’s 
Mubarak and Yemen’s Saleh. Once it became clear that the US 
let events run their course and prioritised its nuclear negotiations 
with Iran over maintaining the Saudi-led status quo in the Middle 
East, the initial Saudi framework quickly gave way to one of 
conservative realpolitik – disguised as sectarian strife.39 The 
                                                     
37 Moreover, in a recent twitter exchange, Hamidreza Azizi (@HamidRe-
zaAz) cogently pointed out that the Chinese government may progress BRI 
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38 Ahmadian and Mohseni (2019), op.cit. 
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remedy that the Saudi’s deployed in response was a much more 
assertive middle eastern foreign policy.40 In Syria, this took the 
form of supporting a range of moderate and not-so-moderate 
proxies to overthrow President Assad, who was recast from fel-
low autocrat into Iranian ally. The evolution of the Syrian bat-
tlefield has by now demonstrated the shortcomings of this 
strategy in the face of – probably underestimated – direct and 
large-scale Iranian and Russian support for the Syrian regime.  
As far as its involvement in Syria goes, the Saudi monarchy 
arguably scored a victory at the level of discourse rather than on 
the battlefield. Caught between accusations that IS derived much 
of its theological basis from Wahabi religious thought and global 
astonishment at the meteoric rise of radical Sunni militancy, the 
sectarian Sunni vs. Shi’a frame offered the Saudi monarchy a 
‘get-out-of-jail-free-card’ of sorts. By shifting the focus of the 
conflict towards Iranian hegemonial ambitions, Saudi Arabia su-
perseded discussions about how Sunni militant extremism could 
have grown so rapidly, relegating the longstanding observation 
that Shi’a religious tenets and doctrine have seldom been a core 
driver of either Iranian strategy or extremist violence to the back-
ground.41 As it failed on the battlefield, Saudi strategy shifted 
from fighting Iran in Syria to bandwagoning with the Trump ad-
ministration against Iran. Consequentially, it stands to reason 
that the Saudis have little interest in supporting the reconstruc-
tion of Syria.42 
                                                     
wars: Uprisings and anarchy in the Middle East, New York: Public Affairs, 
2016. 
40 Van den Berg, W., Saudi Arabia’s strategic stalemate: What is next?, The 
Hague: Clingendael, 2017. 
41 Scholars already observed in the 1990s that the 1979 Iranian revolution 
was influential because of its ideas and ideology rather than the actual ex-
port of a Shi’a theology-based governance model via Shi’a populations 
throughout the region. Esposito, J. (ed.), The Iranian revolution: Its global 
impact, Miami: Florida University Press, 1990. 
42 For the purpose of this essay, I assume that the other Gulf States (minus 
Qatar and Oman) will follow a Saudi lead in terms of their support – or lack 
thereof – for reconstruction efforts of the Syrian regime.  
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While Syria represents one of a number of sites of confron-
tation with Iran to the Saudis (others include Lebanon, Iraq, 
Yemen, Bahrain and Qatar), to Iran it is more existential. Its core 
interests in the Syrian conflict were clear early on, namely re-
taining a friendly, non-Sunni majority regime in Damascus to 
keep Syria in the ‘resistance’ camp and maintaining a direct link 
with Hezbollah. Preventing the spread of Sunni militant extrem-
ism (after 2014) and connecting its different platforms43 of re-
gional influence in Lebanon and Iraq (after 2015) became 
additional interests in due time. The Iranian government has pur-
sued these interests rigorously and with ample resources – in-
cluding financial infusions from Iran’s Central Bank, the 
deployment of thousands of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) personnel, and the mobilisation and deployment of Shi’a 
militias from Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq.44 Iran’s interests 
in Syria have a high intensity preference, which results from at 
least three sources:  
 
• The 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war still influences the collective 
views of much of the Iranian leadership since many current 
members lived through that war. While the war may have 
been instrumental in cementing conservative clerical power 
at home, it also brought about vast destruction and, ulti-
mately, humiliation. Iran had to accept the pre-existing status 
quo after a costly war initiated by an Iraq supported by much 
                                                     
43 Such as Shi’a political parties and militias in Lebanon and Iraq, as well as 
Iran’s relationship with the Kurdish PUK. 
44 Steinberg guestimates a presence of 1,000-–4,000 ICRG advisers, special 
forces and commanders in the Syrian conflict theatre. Alaaldin et al. esti-
mate there are 10,000-35,000 fighters in transnational, Iran-sponsored 
armed groups with Hezbollah contributing another 7,000–10,000 fighters. 
See: Alaaldin, R. et al., A 10-degree shift in Syria strategy, Washington DC: 
Brookings Policy Brief, 2018; Steinberg (2018), op.cit. 
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of the West and the Gulf.45 Preventing its recurrence puts a 
premium on securing the neighbourhood as best as possible, 
including Syria.  
• The US invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) 
provided windows of opportunity for Iran to expand its in-
fluence in both countries as much as they produced clear 
warning signs that US invasion in the context of the ‘axis of 
evil’ or the ‘war on terror’ was not just a hypothetical possi-
bility. Iraq’s descent into chaos after 2003 and 2014 offered 
Iran the chance to establish a more contiguous area of influ-
ence stretching from Lebanon to Iran.46  
• The recent hostile US, Israeli and Saudi rhetoric against Teh-
ran will have encouraged Iranian steadfastness in Syria as it 
re-imprints the ‘war on terror’s’ regime change logic on the 
minds of Iran’s leadership.47 The US’s recent cancellation of 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will have 
further bolstered Iranian resolve to keep any fight as far away 
                                                     
45 Razoux, P., The Iran-Iraq war, Belknap Press: Cambridge, 2015. Inci-
dentally, the IRGC’s Quds force was founded in the Iran-Iraq war to support 
the Kurdish Peshmerga in their fight against Hussein’s regime. 
46 Ironically, in terms of Iranian political influence in Lebanon, Syria and 
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47 The common argument that Iran deploys a resource-light, forward-de-
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monarchies’ armed forces at the crossroads, Paris: IFRI, 2018. For a more 
in-depth assessment of Iran’s deterrence strategy: Ahmadian and Mohseni 
(2019), op.cit. 
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from its frontiers as possible, despite any possible misgiv-
ings in Iranian foreign policy circles about its own role in 
Syria.48 
 
Although the Syrian regime faltered towards the end of 2014, 
despite Iranian support, Russia’s intervention soon tilted the bal-
ance back in Tehran’s favour and it has since steadily increased 
its influence in Syria. Yet, while Russia appears keen to re-es-
tablish at least the core capabilities of the Syrian state, it is 
widely inferred that Iran – building on its practices in Lebanon 
and Iraq – prefers to create a more hybrid arrangement that in-
cludes parastatal organisations, militias, population centres and 
even governance institutions that are loosely associated with the 
state.49 This would create a lever of influence additional to its 
formal and cordial relations with the Syrian regime.50  
Such an approach to ‘reconstruction’ must, however, balance 
two trade-offs. First, it will not match the preferences of the Syr-
ian regime (or those of Russia, for that matter). The Syrian re-
gime may have to tolerate it in the short term due to its own 
weakness but, given its memories and practices of pre-2011 con-
trol, it will not necessarily accept it in the long term. Despite its 
vastly reduced military and economic capabilities, the regime is 
not without agency. Seen from this perspective, cleverly de-
signed external support for reconstruction via the Syrian state 
could actually increase its longer-term independence from Iran. 
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makers in Tehran in January 2019 showed good awareness of the reputa-
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Second, however much Iran might wish, it will struggle to main-
tain a sizeable non-military parallel sphere in a Sunni-dominated 
country.  
In brief, the Iranian view on the reconstruction of Syria de-
viates significantly from the standard, state-centred approach of 
the international community or, for that matter, the preferences 
of the Syrian regime. While Iran’s approach has its limitations, 
establishing selected centres of social control/influence in towns 
like Qusair or around the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine, as well as 
maintaining a security sector-based insurance policy by retain-
ing direct lines of command to a number of militia forces, are 
within its reach. 
 
The bit-players of the Syrian conflict: Turkey and Israel 
Turkish interests in the Syrian civil war narrowed considerably 
between 2012 and 2018 – from the overthrow of President Assad 
to reducing the territorial gains and self-rule of Syria’s Kurds.51 
The concern of the Turkish elite about the rise of Syria’s Kurds 
must primarily be considered in the context of its own unre-
solved Kurdish question, which Turkey has traditionally viewed 
through an unvarnished lens of narrowly-defined nationalism 
and assimilation.52 But Turkey’s anti-Kurdish focus across Tur-
key, Syria and Iraq (excepting the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) will also persist because it serves as a useful deflector 
away from its domestic economic turmoil and poor relations 
with the US and EU. 
For the purpose of this essay, three observations on Tur-
key’s involvement in the Syrian civil war matter. First, the Turk-
ish occupation of Afrin, Jarablus, Al-Bab and adjacent areas – 
which was initially seen as a temporary measure to prevent and 
undo the creation of a Kurdish-dominated Turkish-Syrian border 
                                                     
51 Van Veen, E. and E. Yüksel, Too big for its boots, Turkish foreign policy 
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52 Gunes, C. and R. Lowe, The impact of the Syrian war on Kurdish politics 
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area – is starting to show signs of permanence in terms of recon-
struction, military presence and a cross-border link being estab-
lished.53 Second, the failure of Turkey’s anti-Assad strategy, 
coupled with its occupation of Syrian territory, has put it on a 
future collision course with the Syrian regime. Interestingly, 
Russia greenlighted Turkish military moves against the wishes 
of both the Syrian regime and Iran, presumably with the inten-
tion of enhancing its own leverage vis-à-vis both actors. Third, 
Turkish companies are well placed to benefit commercially from 
engaging in Syria’s reconstruction – especially in the Aleppo 
area – due to the large Syrian diaspora on Turkish territory and 
its geographic proximity.54 
On balance, this suggests that Turkey might engage more 
deeply in reconstruction of the parts of Syria it currently occu-
pies as a hedge against the Syrian Kurds, as long as it can main-
tain these areas as part of its own sphere of influence. For 
example, it is imaginable that its Syrian proxies will loosely in-
tegrate with the SAA to police the area but retain substantial 
Turkish links. To this effect, it could come to a practical arrange-
ment with the Syrian regime that also includes support for re-
construction in regime-held areas as long as this involves 
Turkish companies. Given the antipathy between Assad and Er-
dogan, this may require a Russian-mediated deal that also re-
solves the Idlib question and engages Turkey in efforts to 
remove the US military presence from northeastern Syria alto-
gether. 
As to Israel, its initial stance of benign neglect towards the 
Syrian civil war under the motto ‘where two dogs fight over a 
bone…’ has boomeranged now that it is faced with the specter 
of increasing Iranian influence and permanent, Iran-linked mili-
tary installations on Syrian soil. While this has significantly 
raised the stakes for Israel, the country has little leverage over 
                                                     
53 See for example: Tastekin, F., Turkey wants its share of Syria’s recon-
struction, Al-Monitor, 15 August 2018 (accessed 15 October 2018). 
54 Turkey was also the main economic beneficiary of the Iran-Iraq war. See: 
Razoux (2015), op.cit.  
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the politics of the Syrian civil war other than the airstrikes it reg-
ularly executes against SAA, Hezbollah and Iran-affiliated 
forces. Although it used to conduct these with impunity, the IL-
20M incident on 18 September 2018, subsequent Russian rheto-
ric and Russia’s deployment of several S-300 missile batteries to 
the benefit of the SAA have made their continuation somewhat 
more delicate.55 Despite Russian cooperation with Israel to re-
move Iran-affiliated forces from the direct vicinity of the Syrian-
Israeli border area, the ongoing process of integration of foreign 
and domestic pro-regime militias into the SAA could easily 
muddle the waters for Israeli strike planners in the near future. 
Should Iran try to restart its earlier efforts to establish a mil-
itary presence in southwestern Syria, it would put itself on a dan-
gerous collision course with Israel, and perhaps even Russia. 
Yet, because this scenario does not serve the Iranian short-term 
interest of consolidating its influence in Syria, it is more likely 
that the informal buffer zone already in place in the southwest 
will be maintained to defuse the situation – for now.56 Alterna-
tively, should Israel decide to launch an all-out air campaign 
against Iranian military assets across Syria, the risks of confron-
tation with Iran, as well as with Russia, would increase. Its recent 
strike patterns do not, however, support this scenario as they are 
                                                     
55 Suchov, M., Is Russia’s S-300 delivery to Syria a gamechanger?, Al-
Monitor, 10 October 2018 (accessed 15 October 2018). Israel carried out 
roughly half as many air strikes in Syria in the six months after the IL-20M 
incident as in the six before (~20 vs 40). There was a two month absence of 
attacks after the IL-20M incident, but strikes picked up in recent months. 
The targets have been pretty much the same: SAA, Iran-affiliated and Hez-
bollah forces. Source: Email exchange with an ACLED researcher on 20 
March 2019.  
56 International Crisis Group, Israel, Hezbollah and Iran: Preventing an-
other war in Syria, Brussels: ICG, 2018b; Ahmadian and Mohseni (2019), 
op.cit.  
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concentrated on the Damascus area and military research facili-
ties in western Syria.57 A mutually tolerated stalemate with a re-
spectful distance between them is the more likely future for 
SAA-embedded Iranian militia forces and their Israeli Defense 
Forces counterparts. 
Overall, it is plausible to assume that Israel will diplomati-
cally and discretely support Russia’s efforts to enable the re-es-
tablishment of the Syrian central state through state-led 
reconstruction efforts to counter Iranian influence while main-
taining its airstrike policy as long as it can.  
 
Implications for reconstruction 
This essay has addressed the question of how the interests of key 
foreign state actors in the Syrian conflict will help or hinder re-
construction of those parts of the country under the control of 
President Assad. Its key findings and insights are summarised 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
57 Murciano, G., Preventing a spillover of the Iran-Israel conflict in Syria, 
SWP Comment, No. 27, 2018; Anderson, S. and Muaz, A., Israeli strikes in 
Syria: Calculated messages to the regime and its allies, ACLED, Online 
(accessed 15 October 2018). 
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Table 1: Key interests of selected foreign state actors in the Syrian con-
flict & implications for reconstruction efforts in Assad-held areas 
 
State actor Key current interests 
in the Syrian conflict 
Preference 
intensity in 
Syria  
Assets 
deployed 
in 
Syria58 
Leverage 
on course 
of conflict 
Likely implications for reconstruc-
tion support 
US Eliminating IS  
 
Moderate 
Low Low 
− May support reconstruction framed as 
‘stabilisation’ in Kurdish-controlled 
northeast Syria 
− Refrains from all other reconstruction  
 Weakening Iran Moderate 
Russia Reasserting itself as a 
global power 
High 
High High 
− Strives for internationally accepted 
conflict resolution 
− Lobbies others to support ‘minimum 
reconstruction’ of Syrian state 
− Seeks commercial benefit 
 Re-establishing a 
friendly Syrian state 
High 
 Unmooring Turkey 
from the West 
Low 
EU Bringing a political 
transition about 
Moderate Nil Low − No reconstruction support unless the 
elusive political transition occurs 
− Focus by necessity on regional refugee 
situation 
− Weakening Iran is not a consideration 
Saudi Arabia Overthrow of Assad as 
ally of Iran 
High Low Low None likely to be forthcoming beyond 
bare minimum required for normalisa-
tion of relations 
Iran Retaining a friendly re-
gime 
High 
High High 
− Support for ‘minimum reconstruction’ 
of Syrian regime 
− Reconstruction of a quasi-autonomous 
sphere of influence  
 Establishing a parallel 
sphere of influence 
High 
 Connecting its areas of 
influence in the Middle 
East 
Moderate 
Turkey Undoing Kurdish au-
tonomy gains 
High Moderate Low − Reconstruction of occupied bits of 
northern Syria to establish a zone of 
influence 
− May seek commercial benefit 
Israel Rollback of Iran-linked 
military presence 
High Moderate Low − No direct reconstruction support 
− May discretely support Russian fund-
raising efforts as part of its anti-Iran 
strategy 
                                                     
58 Excluding humanitarian aid and related efforts. 
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Based on Table 1, a few initial answers to the main question 
of the essay can be outlined:  
First, if the current military balance and presence of forces 
persist without a negotiated diplomatic breakthrough, Syria’s re-
construction is likely to be territorially fragmented, limited in 
nature and driven by Iran-Russia-Assad, Turkey and the US in 
their respective areas of influence. Iran will work closely with 
the Syrian regime and Russia although significant tensions will 
continue to exist between these three actors.59 Turkey may also 
work with Russia to some extent. 
Second, reconstruction of regime-held areas of Syria is 
likely to be protracted and partial as the demand for infrastruc-
ture, housing, education and governance will outstrip the supply 
of available funds for the foreseeable future. This observation 
will hold as long as the US, EU, key European countries and 
Gulf countries maintain their current policies towards the Syrian 
regime, which they are likely to do for the time being. 
Third, should any of the preceding actors change policy, 
support for reconstruction will be implemented in a politically 
contentious and commercially profiteering environment charac-
terised by crony capitalism and nepotism in which Iranian, Rus-
sian and Syrian interests compete to influence the shape, focus 
and functions of the Syrian state as it is re-established. 
In the final analysis, the combination of the variable global 
interests of the US (war on terror, anti-Iran) and Russia (re-es-
tablishing great power status, keeping Syria on its side) with re-
gional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran makes the 
reconstruction of Syria hostage to irreconcilable agendas given 
the country’s association with Iran. Potential intermediaries such 
                                                     
59 Such tensions are for example analyzed and explored in: Hatahet, S., Rus-
sia and Iran: Economic influence in Syria, London: Chatham House, 2019; 
Khatib and Sinjab (2018), op.cit. For a longer-term analysis beyond the Syr-
ian conflict: Zandi, D. (ed.), Dynamics of Iran-Russia relations: Changing 
regional and international scenes and the necessity of cooperation, IRS pa-
pers # 1/96, 2017. 
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as Turkey and the EU will not engage in countrywide reconstruc-
tion at this point. Turkey suffers from domestic turmoil and rad-
ical shifts in its foreign policy that have rendered it ineffective, 
while the EU’s foreign policy indecisiveness has relegated it to 
the sidelines. Israel was never going to engage directly in Syria’s 
reconstruction but also finds itself without political influence 
other than the one-trick pony of its regular airstrikes.  
There is an urgent need for detailed scenario-planning that 
explores the long-term consequences of the fragmented, incre-
mental and limited reconstruction that will result from the above 
state of play for the Syrian regime, the Syrian population, Syria’s 
neighbours and beyond. 
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 5 
State-led urban development in Syria and 
the prospects for effective post-conflict  
reconstruction 
 
NADINE ALMANASFI 
 
As the militarized phase of the Syrian Uprising and Civil War 
winds down, questions surrounding how destroyed cities and 
towns will be rebuilt, with what funding and by whom pervade 
the political discourse on Syria.1 There have been concerns that 
if the international community engages with reconstruction ef-
forts they are legitimizing the regime and its war crimes, leaving 
the regime in a position to control and benefit from reconstruc-
tion. Acting Assistance Secretary of State of the United States, 
Ambassador David Satterfield states that until a political process 
is in place that ensure the Syrian people are able to choose a 
leadership ‘without Assad at its helm’, then the United states will 
not be funding reconstruction projects. The Ambassador of 
France to the United Nations also stated that France will not be 
taking part in any reconstruction process ‘unless a political tran-
sition is effectively carried out’ and this is also the position of 
the European Union.2 Bashar al-Assad himself has outrightly 
                                                     
1 Beals, E (2018). Assad’s Reconstruction Agenda Isn’t Waiting for Peace. 
Neither Should Ours. Available: https://tcf.org/content/report/assads-recon-
struction-agenda-isnt-waiting-peace-neither/?agreed=1. 
2 Irish, J & Bayoumy, Y. (2017). Anti-Assad nations say no to Syria recon-
struction until political process on track. Available: https://uk.reu-
ters.com/article/uk-un-assembly-syria/anti-assad-nations-say-no-to-syria-
reconstruction-until-political-process-on-track-idUKKCN1BU04J.  
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claimed that the West will have no part to play in the reconstruc-
tion of Syria.3 Russia has asked for the depoliticization of recon-
struction efforts in Syria, but if the bulk of the efforts are to be 
led by the Syrian regime, it’s current approach to rebuilding de-
stroyed areas does not bode well for a neutral “de-politicized” 
post-conflict reconstruction strategy for the country.  
This paper will use two underlying theoretical approaches 
to analyse how the Syrian regime’s approach to reconstruction 
is not merely a result of the civil war, but in fact is tied to a longer 
history of political authoritarianism and the utilization of iden-
tity for political ends which has intersected with urban planning 
practices in the past. The first method is authoritarian upgrading, 
which as described by Steven Heydemann, is the way in which 
a regime will adapt its policies and governance to reflect chang-
ing social, political and economic conditions in an attempt to 
maintain power. The second is sectarianization which recognizes 
the manipulation and weaponization of identity in the Middle 
East and how it is used to stoke fear and generate political loy-
alty.  
By using these two approaches, this paper aims to look at 
how regime-led urban development efforts have and will pro-
duce knock on effects for the demographic makeup of towns and 
cities in Syria. By bringing to light this relationship exposed via 
the various economic and housing laws that have been imple-
mented before and during the civil war, one can see how urban 
development has been politicised and how it solidifies infra-
structural inequalities and reinforces authoritarian rule. This re-
lationship between urban development and political 
authoritarianism is important to understand because it raises con-
cerns for egalitarian and inclusive post-conflict reconstruction 
scenarios that would be led by the Syrian regime – and that are 
already taking place.  
                                                     
3 (2018). ‘We don’t need the West’: Assad to ban foreign money from Syria 
reconstruction. Available: https://www.rt.com/news/430833-syria-ban-west-
ern-investors-assad/. 
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This paper will be split into four sections. Three sections 
separate the Syrian regime’s urban development approaches into 
three time periods. The first section will be a brief scene-setter 
which explores how sectarianized identities interacted with ur-
ban development activity from 1970-2000. The second section, 
from 2000 – 2011, looks at Bashar al-Assad’s ascent and the role 
of economic liberalization in urban development policies. The 
third section will assess 2011 – present day, and the neoliberal 
economic agenda that is driving the creation of luxury housing 
projects and what this means for post-conflict reconstruction ef-
forts. Finally, recommendations will be outlined on how to move 
forward in a post-conflict reconstruction setting in Syria. This 
historical timeline will show that what is novel and should be 
included in analysis of Syria is that these policies of urban de-
velopment that facilitate authoritarianism are not new, they pre-
date the conflict and as a result are likely to become a cycle that 
will repeat itself until addressed.  
Throughout the analysis, examples and case studies will 
come primarily from Damascus and Aleppo. As the two major 
cities in the country, they have dealt with the most rural to urban 
migration, economic development has been focused on these cit-
ies and they have been some of the first cities to receive infra-
structural and developmental support as the conflict started to 
wind down. It is logical to assume they would be the first cities 
to be the focus of the regime’s redevelopment efforts because of 
these conditions, particularly in the areas that have witnessed po-
litical dissent. 
 
 
Authoritarian upgrading and sectarianization as underlying 
theoretical approaches 
 
Authoritarian Upgrading 
With the move towards a more interconnected global society, 
authoritarian upgrading means adapting not just on a national or 
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regional level, but also according to international trends. Steven 
Heydemann explains that regimes are practising a kind of ‘hy-
brid authoritarianism’ where they are keeping old practices of 
‘coercion, surveillance, patronage, corruption and personalism’ 
whilst trying to balance international demands of ‘globalization, 
markets and democratization’.4 Syria’s march towards liberali-
zation particularly under Bashar Al-Assad shows how the state 
recognized the need to adapt its economic policies in particular, 
but unfortunately did not see any benefit in doing the same for 
its political structures.5 As described by Volker Perthes, Syria 
‘disproves the idea that economic and political liberalization go 
hand in hand’.6 This current creation of high-end housing and 
luxury commercial complexes as part of Syria’s reconstruction 
that this paper will analyse further reinforces the fact that the 
Syrian regime is in fact pursuing stricter economic liberalization 
measures whilst retaining repressive political structures. This 
political authoritarianism has been exemplified during the Syr-
ian Civil War with the disappearances, murder and displacement 
of political opposition and an estimated 500,000 of its popula-
tion.7  
 
Sectarianization 
In order for the Syrian state to ‘upgrade’ its authoritarianism it 
needed to secure political loyalties. Sectarianization was the pro-
cess by which the state could, and did, utilize specific commu-
nity concerns to their advantage. Sectarianization itself is a new 
term that moves away from defining identity-based tensions - as 
                                                     
4 Heydemann, S. (2007). Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World. 
Available: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10arab-
world.pdf. p.3 
5 See Haddad, B. (20120). The Syrian Regime’s Business Backbone. 
6 Perthes, V. (1996). Elements and prospects of political change: stages of 
economic and political liberalization. In: Kienle, E Contemporary Syria: Lib-
eralization Between Cold War and Peace. Bloomsbury. p.70. 
7 (2018). Syrian Observatory says war has killed more than half a mil-
lion. Available: https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-7-
years-11-vetoes-500000-dead. 
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has been done in multi-sectarian societies - as naturally ‘sec-
tarian’, unchanging and inevitable. In this way, sectarianization 
avoids essentializing and solely sectarian-ethnic identity analy-
sis. Sectarianization emphasizes political actors as the main 
driver behind identity-based tensions either increasing or de-
creasing.  
According to Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel who posit 
this idea, these political actors, primarily regimes, do not in fact 
readily control the whole of their population, and as a result re-
sort to manipulation and authoritarianism to dominate, and have 
to continually carry out a process of upgrading in order to main-
tain this control. The state doesn’t hold full control for a variety 
of reasons, and some of these reasons are to do with rural versus 
urban tensions, tribal affiliations, as well as sect, ethnic and 
class-based identities, and particularly during civil wars, infor-
mal and local governances become more trustworthy and relia-
ble than a centralized state apparatus. Regimes make the best of 
such divisions in society to “divide and rule,” to co-opt support-
ers and de-legitimize opponents by playing on identity differ-
ences, notably sectarian cleavages. 
Using the term sectarianization, the starting point is not in 
identity, but in the way that those in power treat pre-existing and 
not necessarily politically-activated identities and modes of self-
organization to ensure the loyalty of their support base and quell 
potential opposition. With this framework of sectarianization, 
class-based identities can also be incorporated into the analysis 
in order to understand how the use of patronage, corruption and 
cronyism, as referenced by Heydemann, impact communities. 
Using the term ‘sectarian’ places class in a separate category to 
sect and ethnic based identities which is not entirely possible in 
the Syrian context as the two intimately interact. 
 
1970 – 2000: rural and urban identities, housing and migration 
With the rural population of Syria accounting for 61.3% of the 
total population in 1960, any political party that was looking to 
assume power in Syria would need to appease this mass, and the 
Syria Studies   63 
Ba’ath Party was no different.8 It is clear that the political actors 
who were vying for power during and after independence in 
Syria saw the importance of appealing to the rural population 
through more egalitarian land policies. They understood how 
important agriculture as well as issues of uneven land distribu-
tion and ownership were to the people of Syria and its economy.9 
With the ascension of the Ba’ath Party came an ideology 
that was based around the socialism of its founders and follow-
ing generations. The ideological beginnings of the Ba’ath Party 
were focused on land redistribution and subsidies, engaging with 
an ‘agrarian radicalism’ intended for the support of the rural 
peasantry in Syria.10 It is also worth noting that the make-up of 
the generation of Ba’athists that implemented these policies 
were primarily of rural and minority origin, and some analysts 
have mentioned this as a factor in their support for early policies 
of land reform. High ranking members of the Ba’ath Military 
Bureau hailed from provincial towns and also minority back-
grounds, rarely graduating beyond high school degree.11 These 
were the people who eventually, through the Ba’ath Party Re-
gional Command Military Bureau, led the 1970s coup that saw 
the rise of Hafez al-Assad as President of Syria. But this link 
between rural/urban identities and land has existed since before 
Syria’s independence. The French Mandate period left a legacy 
of spatial segregation based on sect and ethnicity, with what has 
been described as an ‘active sympathy towards rural popula-
tions’ particularly in Alawi and Jabal Druze areas.12 Here rural 
and ethnic identities were intertwined and made inseparable 
from spatial arrangements.  
                                                     
8 Batatu, H (1999). Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural 
Notables, and Their Politics. Princeton University Press. p.6 
9 Azmeh, S. (2011). The Uprising of the Marginalized: A Socio-Economic 
Perspective of the Syrian Uprising. Available: https://core.ac.uk/down-
load/pdf/35433799.pdf. p.6 
10 Haddad, B (2011). Business Networks in Syria The Political Economy of 
Authoritarian Resilience. Stanford University Press. P.49. 
11 Batatu, H. Syria’s Peasantry. p.37 
12 Ibid, p.156 
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It was well documented that the mid-sixties and early 1970s 
saw power initially shift into the ‘geographically peripheral, so-
cially ascending and ethnically minoritarian sectors of society’.13 
The popularity of the Ba’ath party by those ‘geographically pe-
ripheral’ citizens can also be seen in the make-up of the Ba’ath 
Party membership in 1979. The largest population of members 
came from smaller towns and cities such as Homs, (4,332) Hama 
(4,753), Tartus (4,530) and Latakia (3,691), and again in 1992 
these areas had the largest memberships with Homs at 20,882 
members, Latakia at 19,635, Tartus at 19,669 and Damascus at 
13,779.14 At the same time, Volker Perthes described the devel-
opment strategy of the 1970s as ‘inegalitarian’, fostering an ‘en-
riched stratum… which included some higher echelons of the 
bureaucracy, the party, and the military as well as new commer-
cial bourgeoisie who owed their status to the business ties to the 
state’.15 From this we can ascertain that there was a mix of class-
based but also minority ethnic and sect based support mobilized 
by the state, a strategy of domestic-alliance building that has 
been followed to this day.  
The rural population began to decline with increasing mi-
gration to urban centres due to state expansion of civil, military 
and intelligence branches opening up public sector employment. 
There was a slow decline in the rural population of Syria from 
the 61.3% of the 1960 census to 56.5% in 1970, 52.9% in 1981, 
and then 48.6% in 1994.16 Looking at Aleppo, since the French 
Mandate period, the old city and the West of Aleppo were the 
                                                     
13 Bahout, J.(1996). The Syrian business community, its politics and pro-
spects. The Syrian Business Community . In: Kienle, E Contemporary 
Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Peace. l: Bloomsbury. p.76. 
14 Batatu, H. Syria’s Peasantry. p.181 
15 Perthes, V. Elements and prospects of political change. p.54 
16 Batatu, H. Syria’s Peasantry, p.5-6. This should read with the recognition 
that women working on family farms weren’t included in these figures and 
neither were Bedouins.in these figures and neither were Bedouins  
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traditional hubs of the city. These areas housed the central mar-
kets and the political bureaucracy such as the regional headquar-
ters of state institutions. This continued during Bashar al-
Assad’s period where to this day security agencies and the mili-
tary apparatus as well as the mayor’s offices, the university and 
hospitals are found in the West.17 However, the 1950s and 1960s 
saw an expansion of the city to the East which, as a result, be-
came home to newer migrants. Jean Claude Davide, a colleague 
of the architects responsible for Aleppo’s urban re-development 
Michel Ecochard and Gyoji Banshoya, highlighted this East-
West separation when he wrote of the modern bourgeoisie con-
sisting of mostly Sunni but also Christians residing in the West 
alongside most of the ‘state and regime infrastructure’ such as 
the Artillery Base, Military Intelligence, Military Academy, Air 
Defence Base as well as the water tanks of the city. In contrast, 
the Eastern neighbourhoods were, and still are, home to small 
mosques and schools as well as more informal markets.18 The 
1974 urbanization plan for Aleppo was an attempt at moderniza-
tion that expanded the city’s centre and connected the old city to 
newer developments via new roads.19 This plan shows the state’s 
attempt to respond to urban migration and economic growth, but 
with it we see the perpetuation of the segregation of East and 
West Aleppo. Resources were provided to the West of the city, 
and the continued embourgeoisement of Western Aleppo took 
place.20 During the early 1990s there was a partial process of 
                                                     
17 Khaddour, K. (2017). Consumed by War: The End of Aleppo and North-
ern Syria’s Political Order . Available: http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/13783.pdf. p.5 
18 Davide, J. (2016). Comment L'histoire explicque l'actualité D'Alep. Quelles 
raisons historiques peuvent-elles expliquer que la ville soit un enjeu 
aujourd'hui?. Available: https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Comment-
l-histoire-explique-l-actualite-d-Alep-Partie-2-Quelles-raisons.html. 
19 UNESCO. (1980). The Conservation of the old city of Aleppo: Syrian Arab 
Republic. Available: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000042161. 
p.35 
20 Davide, J. (2016). Comment L'histoire explicque l'actualité D'Alep. 
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economic liberalization, but only 17.6% of the private invest-
ment opportunities being distributed by the state were afforded 
to Aleppo as opposed to the 50% being given to Damascus.21 
This eventually improved towards the end of the 1990s and early 
2000s, showing that the regime recognized the need to secure the 
loyalty of the Aleppine urban business class. Although it is not 
as clear cut as this, general trends show that there was an inter-
dependency between East and West Aleppo along economic 
lines. Those in the West were owners of businesses and the East-
ern residents were blue-collar workers providing the workforce. 
The divisions of the city of Aleppo were and continue to be more 
along the lines of class as opposed to sect or ethnicity, and one 
even sees these fault lines drawn out in the destruction of the city 
in the 2016 battle for Aleppo. 
A similar process of migration of newer urban dwellers was 
also taking place in Damascus. The population jumped from 
529,963 in 1960 to 836,668 in 1970, and by 1981 the population 
was at 1,112,214. Sami al-Jundi, the Ba’ath Minister of Infor-
mation after the 1963 Syrian coup, claimed that ‘caravans of vil-
lagers began moving from the plains and mountains towards 
Damascus, and the perturbing qaf soon dominated its streets and 
coffeehouses, and the waiting rooms in government offices’.22 
Here, al-Jundi is referencing the use of the letter qaf in the Ara-
bic language, which is not a trait of the colloquial Arabic of 
Damascenes, showing that there was a large enough migration 
of non-Damascenes into the city to recognize these linguistic dif-
ferences and subsequently a demographic change in the capital. 
The map below - from Masanori Naito’s 1982 paper on the urban 
development of Damascus - shows how the city expanded be-
tween 1945 and 1983, corroborating the census data. As is 
shown from this graph, areas such as Barzeh, Qaboun, Jobar, 
Midan, and Kafr Sousseh were newer developments from 1983 
                                                     
21 Khaddour, K. Consumed by War. p.9 
22 Batatu, H. Syria’s Peasantry. p.160 
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onwards, and as will be discussed in the second part of this pa-
per, these areas witnessed intense violence and destruction dur-
ing the civil war.  
After the 1970s, and as it implemented more economically 
liberal policies, the regime recognized the need to transform its 
political base. The alliance between the state apparatus and the 
business class facilitated stability for the regime.23 The state 
needed to attract a base beyond the rural peasantry, small town 
citizens and minority groups, and as a result this meant engaging 
with those communities that had been side-lined initially or that 
there had been previous tensions with, for example, the urban 
and predominantly Sunni business class of the cities. More em-
phasis was placed on securing economic growth and developing 
networks based on class, and one can see the beginnings of a 
move away from their original constituencies of support, defin-
ing their political base more along the lines of an urban identity, 
                                                     
23 Hinnebusch, R. (1997). Debates on Syrian Political Economy under the 
Ba’ath. In: Perthes, V. The Political Economy of Syria Under Asad. p.2 
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particularly amongst the newer generation of Syrians that are 
only now in positions of influence in the Syrian business world.  
Indeed, many of these new businessmen are the children of the 
political elite. 
Syria’s independent origins still retained remnants of colo-
nial identity-based divisions, and with a Ba’ath Party who were 
ideologically fixated on economic redistribution, it was inevita-
ble that identity would continue to play a role in Syrian society. 
With increased migration flows into the larger urban cities like 
Damascus and Aleppo, the rural and urban classes had begun to 
interact and the state had to learn how to balance support for their 
original rural loyalists and the urban business class who they 
would need to appease to ensure stable economic liberalization 
while still retaining political control.  
 
2000-2011, Syria’s housing crisis, economy and pre-war regeneration 
The beginning of the 21st century was a turning point for Syria’s 
economy. As the country was aligning more with global prac-
tices in the Western world, there was a sense that a new era was 
arriving in Syria and even a level of hope for political reforms. 
Activists in Damascus were engaging with the new President, 
Bashar al-Assad, who was tentatively showing willingness to 
their demands of multiparty democracy, release of political pris-
oners and economic rights to all citizens.24  Unfortunately this 
optimism was short lived and as discussed below, despite devel-
opments in privatizing the economy and stimulating growth that 
emerged with Bashar Al Assad, the demands that came with a 
steady urbanization rate – one of those being the need for more 
housing - still remained a serious problem for the country.  
In 2005, via the government’s General Establishment for 
Housing, it was reported that 13,500 people signed up to a hous-
ing scheme in Damascus that was building only 410 flats in the 
city, and 70,000 young people enrolled in a youth housing 
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scheme that was only intended for 10,000.25 A United Nations’ 
Habitat report of 2006 stated that Syria was facing a demand of 
120 thousand flats per year.26 The need for housing was outstrip-
ping state capacity to build new accommodation, and increased 
urbanization to the capital city and other major cities wasn’t 
making the situation any easier. Between 2003 and 2004, 1.2 – 
1.5 million residents moved from rural areas to urban centres.27 
In 2007, it was expected that the rate of urbanization would go 
from 51% to 61% in the next 25 years, and municipal develop-
ment was suggesting that the urban population of Syria would 
shoot up from 12.1 million in 2010 to 18.3 million in 2025.28 
This is Syria’s urban development-based context in the early 
2000s. This section will document the period of the 21st century 
before the civil war, looking at how privatization and informal 
housing were two important thematic strands to understand in 
the country, and can help us to understand how – whether inten-
tionally or not - the foundations were set for further identity-
based migration and demographic re-organization in Damascus 
in particular. 
 
Privatization and regeneration strategies 
Before the civil war there was an increase in the planning of lux-
ury housing and commercial projects in Damascus, as well as 
attempts to redevelop informal housing. Although many of these 
projects did not reach completion, they express a vision for Da-
mascus in particular and the direction Syrian society as a whole 
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was headed in. This vision was one that intended to raise the so-
cial status of the major cities and evidence suggests this was at 
the expense of poorer communities. 
Housing strategies reflected the broader development strat-
egy pursued especially after 2000, shaped by neo-liberalism and 
associated moves toward privatization. Privatization in Syria 
during the early 2000s blurred the line between state and private 
sector ownership. Those businesspeople that were engaging in 
this joint state-private sector activity were empowered through 
the new economic strategy of 2005 which was announced at the 
10th Regional Command Conference. Syria’s 10th five-year plan 
of 2005 recognized the need for economic reform in light of both 
domestic and foreign policy concerns such as decreasing oil re-
serves, and so presented a form of social market economy that 
would guide Syria moving forward.29 These informal business 
networks were, and continue to be, the backbone of Syria’s 
march towards economic liberalization in the early twenty-first 
century, contributing towards large wealth disparities which are 
most striking through the new buildings projects of Damascus 
that will be explored further on in this paper. Individuals such as 
Rami Makhlouf, Muhammad Hamsho and Jamal Abdulkarim – 
all now, coincidentally, facing economic sanctions by the US 
government for their involvement in the war economy and prof-
iteering from the Syrian civil war - represent this business class 
that blurred the lines, and the kinds of benefits afforded to family 
and friends close to the state. 
The Damascus Cham Holding Company was one such ex-
ample of how businesses were empowered through these new 
economic policies. The Damascus Cham Holding Company – 
supported by President Bashar al-Assad - was set up in 2015 and 
held a capital of $279 million dollars.30 While the state held a 
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share, it also brought together 70 of Syria’s largest businessmen, 
with the majority shareholder being Rami Makhlouf who also 
owned more than half of the company.31 These public-private 
enterprises were important because they reinforced those very 
informal networks that had already monopolized Syria’s grow-
ing private sector since the 1980s. 
Public-private enterprises or partnerships (PPP), also 
known as ‘mixed sector companies’ were encouraged through 
Law No. 10 of 1991. This law enabled the state to remain a ‘si-
lent partner’ in a company but still hold a minimum of 25% of 
the shares. Individual private shareholders who wished to be part 
of a mixed company were not permitted to hold more than 5% 
of the equity capital.32 There was clearly an opening up of the 
private sector in Syria through Law No. 10 but it was only an 
economic opening amidst the backdrop of a state concerned with 
trying to hold onto control through political authoritarianism. 
Between 2007 and 2010, there were a number of real estate pro-
jects started in Damascus that were examples of these public-
private partnerships (PPPs) such as the Garden City Resorts, 
Eighth Gate and Bonyan City. They attracted up to $20 billion 
of investment.33 Damascus Hills is another project that was in 
the design phase before the civil war began in 2011 with the goal 
of building 7,500 residential units that would house up to 30,000 
people, offering a ‘21st century mountain resort lifestyle’.34 The 
project had to be put on hold as it was being built in the suburbs 
of Damascus that were to see intense violence and conflict dur-
ing the civil war. Damascus Hills had been criticised for its fail-
ure to actually address the housing crisis that Syria was facing, 
and instead was being used as an opportunity to generate income 
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for the government and its private partners from the more well 
off parts of society. 35 It is not explicit but it is clear that these 
houses would only be available to a certain class of Syrian that 
would be able to afford to spend in the restaurants, resorts and 
rented offices of these complexes.  
Historically and from a European context, these kinds of 
suburbs of a city were understood as areas where the well-to-do 
would move to in order to avoid the dirt and toil of the inner city. 
Brook, Mooney and Pile explain how the suburbs were an at-
tempt at ‘de-intensifying urban social relations’ for those that 
could afford to do so. Suburbs are seen as ‘stable’, and a ‘ho-
mogenous community’ with a ‘moral landscape’. In the Middle 
East, Mona Fawaz and Najib Hourani discuss their respective 
cities, Beirut and Amman, and how urban social relations inter-
act in these specific Middle Eastern contexts. Hourani writes of 
the Arab city as consisting of ‘differential spaces and fragments 
that… reflects a wedding of oligarchic power and persistent co-
lonial ontologies’. With Amman, he highlights the link between 
neoliberalism, the contemporary Jordanian economic reality and 
a geographical politics of inclusion and exclusion in the city. In 
Neoliberal Urbanity, and the Right to the City: A View from Bei-
rut’s Periphery, Mona Fawaz (2009) tries to understand the de-
mographic composition of Beirut in light of neoliberal economic 
policies and a legacy of violent civil war. She pays particular 
attention to the role of informal housing in the city and these 
alternative networks created in ‘slums’, and how a whole world 
of political and economic relations exists outside of the state. 
This understanding looks at the perspective of the dweller of in-
formal housing and their way of organizing within such a struc-
ture. that alienates residents through processes of inclusion and 
exclusion. These informal housing residents have no choice but 
to create alternative networks of welfare and housing support in 
the absence of the state which has neglected them. This example 
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in Beirut shows the negative effects of neoliberal economic pol-
icies and their relation to urban housing but also shows the op-
portunity for these disadvantaged residents to self-organize and 
create pockets of local social support systems. This creation of 
alternative networks - occuring through the inclusion and exclu-
sion of communities as gentrification and neoliberal urban pol-
icy – facilitated the ‘restructuring of the social composition of 
Beirut’. The projects started in Damascus add to the examples of 
how freer market economies tied to the development of upper 
class housing complexes are part of a larger phenomenon across 
the Middle East as well as globally in developing countries, but 
also of how these negative overarching socio-economic struc-
tures encourage potential prospects for local, specific and mean-
ingful social support systems started by the residents themselves. 
. 36 
In Syria more specifically, this concept of inclusion and ex-
clusion, and the right to the city is also explored by both Fabrice 
Balanche and Salwa Ismail. Balanche once described Damascus 
as a city of ‘anti-insurgency urban planning’.37 Whilst Salwa Is-
mail wrote of the geographical layout of Damascus and how it 
acts as a physical impediment to protestors and general large-
scale disobedience. Ismail gives the example of the Ummayyad 
Square in the centre of Damascus and how it is ‘fortified from 
all directions’. There are republican guards stationed all around 
the area, the air force headquarters is located nearby as is the 
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chief of staff offices of the army, political police and state secu-
rity.38 It is near enough impossible to physically demonstrate dis-
content and politically organize in Damascus outside of the 
purview of the state. The layout of urban centres is very im-
portant to solidifying control in any area, and one can see that 
the areas of Damascus that are now undergoing redevelopment 
are areas close to centres of power, for example embassies of 
allies, and airports. 
This trend of globalised neoliberal economic activity that 
manifests through housing and urban structures is particularly 
evident in the level of collaborative effort expended by the inter-
national community in the design and implementation of these 
projects in post-conflict Syria. The design process for Damascus 
Hills was facilitated by a British company, Matrix Partnership, 
and the funding was provided by a Dubai-based real estate com-
pany Emaar Partnerships who were funnelling $4 billion into the 
project before the Uprising.39 In these plans, luxury communi-
ties, gated communities and even luxury-gated communities 
were being built not as primary housing for the average Syrian 
family but as secondary homes for those that wish to leave the 
city for the summer or to just relocate temporarily. Those with 
economic privilege could distinguish and separate their geogra-
phies and histories from their perceived other. These complexes 
are filled not only with residential houses but offices, malls and 
gardens to create mini cities that in a way create the opposite of 
a ‘shadow state’ of informal housing settlements that were built 
up around Aleppo and Damascus in particular.40 These new 
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mini-cities are the strategic vision for future Syrian cities in the 
reconstruction era.  
 
Informal housing  
As these new complexes mentioned above were in the pipeline 
in the early 2000s, laws were being put in place to redevelop and 
legalize informal housing. Housing was not affordable for all 
and with 1/3 of the urban population living in informal settle-
ments before the war, this was a crisis that the state could not 
solve alone. Laws were put in place to encourage the private sec-
tor to take up some of the burden while ensuring the activity still 
remained under state control.41 
Ashwaiyat or informal housing/random zones as they are 
termed have been in Syria since the 1960s.42 Despite informal 
housing not being officially registered with the authorities, a 
blind eye had been turned to their development and there was a 
tacit understanding of a need for more affordable and wide-
spread housing to accommodate the influx of rural migrants into 
major cities. With a Kuwaiti Financial Centre report claiming 
that house prices in Damascus were ‘rivalling European capitals’ 
in the early 2000s, economic migrants did not have many other 
choices aside from adapting and thus building informal hous-
ing.43 
There were a number of laws established with the aim of 
solving the rapid development of informal housing such as De-
cree 96 of 1974 which was an attempt to establish cooperative 
housing.44 Law No. 60 of 1979 was another attempt to ‘take care’ 
of urban expansion and prevent informal settlements that were 
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being built without state permission. The law itself enabled mu-
nicipal and regional councils to confiscate land as they pleased 
to prepare for a five-year urban plan.45 There was an amendment 
of Law 60 through Law No. 26 of 2000 which tried to limit this 
abusive confiscation, but to what extent this pacified informal 
patronage networks is unclear.46 With these laws the state be-
came the ‘natural protector of eminent domain’, meaning a state 
is able to take private property and publicly use it so long as the 
state provides compensation to the private owner.47 In this way 
confiscations were legalized. The state was taking control of and 
preventing illegal housing being built, but the public housing 
projects that were being implemented instead were poorly man-
aged, and the public and private landowners that did take control 
of these areas didn’t have the money to develop them properly.48  
The informal housing crisis before Bashar al-Assad came to 
power was treated in such an ad-hoc way that it was always seen 
as a case-by-case problem, and never a deep-rooted systemic is-
sue that required a consistent institutional response. This does 
not mean it wasn’t politicised, rather it just wasn’t treated as a 
political priority by the state. Despite laws being passed, it is 
important to note that there is also a clear discrepancy between 
laws in theory and laws being actualized. The discussion and 
analysis of these laws can and should also be used as a way to 
understand the general narrative and vision the state thought of 
implementing in addition to looking at what the laws meant on 
the ground.  
There were many inconsistent laws implemented by the 
Syrian regime from the year 2000 onwards that can help us to 
unpack the authoritarian approach to housing in the country, de-
spite the inclusion of the private sector in building activity. For 
example, Law 1 of 2003 was implemented to provide a stricter 
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approach to illegal housing being built in existing planning ar-
eas, with larger fines put in place and even jail sentences for 
those who were building.49 A year later, Law 46 of 2004 led to 
the legalization of a lot of informal housing and made it a re-
quirement for authorities to provide services to its residents.50 
The regime had realised that it wouldn’t be financially beneficial 
to destroy the settlements after private companies had put money 
into building them and instead facilitated their legalisation. The 
regime was only accepting of informal settlements if they were 
under state control or regulated by them. By 2006, the regime’s 
5 year plan included efforts to outsource and replace informal 
housing, with the aim of 77% of new formal housing being pro-
vided privately.51 At that time, informal housing was officially 
neither registered as state nor privately property, but rested in a 
state of limbo. It appears that the intention was for the private 
sector to be involved in large housing schemes to replace the 
production of informal housing. The illegal settlement situation 
in Syria was such a problem problematic that in a United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) report of 2006 they were de-
scribed as ‘time bombs which could detonate at any moment’.52 
Informal housing was underfunded and neglected by the state. 
This UNDP quote above shows that grievances  around living 
conditions and welfare support for the less wealthy social classes 
had the potential to boil over beyond just individual complaints 
and turn into some organized form of conflict or demonstration 
of discontent.   
What were these grievances? On the one hand, Law 33 of 
2008 aimed to give property rights to those who lived in informal 
settlements but for a fee. While at the same time the state imple-
mented Law 59 of 2008 which took a tougher stance on informal 
housing, ordering its demolition and the eviction of squatters.53 
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Law 33 is an individualistic attempt to resolve the problem of 
informal housing without taking into account the systemic root 
of the problem which is that increased urbanization was and con-
tinues to pose a risk because of the lack of resources being put 
into the primary housing needs of the population. Law 33 mani-
fests how far Syria was ‘further entrenching market forms of re-
lations in everyday practices’, a definition of neoliberalism as 
used by Mona Fawaz, Professor of Urban Planning.54 As well as 
the economic criticisms of this property titling approach (Robert 
Goulden discusses in further detail), this process of legalization 
with a fee was being forced onto people who did not have a 
choice but to create informal housing that went through incon-
sistent policies of either being ignored, legalized, criminalized, 
confiscated and as the civil war progressed, was in some in-
stances demolished. 
Another example of state failure to recognize the nation-
wide, deep-rooted and institutional problem of informal settle-
ments can be found in Aleppo. In 2009 a report was issued by 
the German company GIZ and the Municipality of Aleppo which 
had created their own informal housing unit. This report was 
done to trace all the informal housing settlements in Aleppo, 
looking at ‘conditions, problems and opportunities’ for policy 
makers and officials to take into consideration via short profiles 
of the 28 informal settlements of Aleppo.55 The profiles are de-
politicized and fail to mention the causes of problems such as 
poverty, high levels of crime and drug use. A report that fails to 
assume responsibility for dilapidated informal housing and is-
sues of poverty and crime, fails to understand the relationship 
between housing grievances and political opposition and insta-
bility, which can lead to the ‘time bombs’ described in the 2006 
UNDP report. 
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Aleppo has a history of urban development that saw the ex-
pansion of the city to the East in the 50s and 60s hence an in-
creased growth of informal settlements. As these settlements 
were comprised of migrants, there was a tendency for them to 
align more with the villages that they came from and the outer 
Aleppo area, as opposed to the city of Aleppo itself. As a result, 
these residents brought with them their own set of social struc-
tures.56 Areas such as Masakin Hanano held migrants from 
Manbij in the East. Shaykh Maqsoud and Al Ashrafiyya were 
home to Syrians from Afrin, and Al Sha’ar and Bab al Neirab 
host migrants from the Eastern Aleppo countryside. There were 
also migrants from Idlib that settled in Saif al Dawlah, Salahed-
dine and Masakin Hanano, and so there is no doubt that their 
traditions, social networks and affiliations were brought with 
them.57 It was documented that an industrialist in Aleppo be-
lieved his ‘secret’ to success was that he never trusted and did 
not give positions of responsibility to people who lived in infor-
mal housing zones, and only depended on his family and those 
in his own social network.58 In Aleppo, those residents from the 
East were seen as ‘poverty stricken, crime-ridden and violent’ 
and there was even too great a ‘cultural distance’ for marriages 
to take place between West and East Aleppans.59 With informal 
housing in Aleppo comprising more than 30% of the total hous-
ing, the informal infrastructure has been described by one Syrian 
architect as creating a ‘parallel and shadow urban city system’.60 
This is a dangerous development that can only be exacerbated 
by continued neglect and ghettoization. Parts of the city are seen 
as ‘good or bad, clean or dirty, safe or dangerous’ where indi-
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viduals are identified and labelled according to their neighbour-
hood.61 These misconceptions of the other are prevalent across 
societies but for it to be so stark in one city with similar sect and 
ethnic structure, with the only real difference being the class fac-
tor, shows that sect-based analyses do not do this city in partic-
ular any justice. It is important to note that there are certain areas 
that don’t fit this informal/formal housing binary such as 
Jama’iat Zahra and Halab Al Jadideh which were built by private 
investors in the 1990s. These areas contain a mix of residents 
from the West of Aleppo but also Eastern residents who moved 
up the social ladder and could afford more modern homes sur-
rounded by commercial shopping areas and public gardens.62  
In Damascus, between 1981 – 1994, 65% of new housing 
needs were met through informal areas.63 With the intensifica-
tion of migration from the coastal areas in the 70s and 80s, new 
informal settlements had to be built. Mezze 86 was one of these 
settlements that emerged and homed members of Rifa’at al 
Asad’s 86 division which consisted of low level army volun-
teers. The area was said to be about 85% Alawite at that time.64 
Qaboun is another informal settlement in Damascus that saw a 
large migration of workers from northern Syria around rural 
Idlib and is part of the later wave of development in Damascus 
as per Masanori Naito’s map shown earlier. Grievances existed 
in Damascus as well, where certain settlements received more 
benefits than others. For example, there was subsidized housing 
for officer corps in areas of Damascus such as Mezzeh 86. Mus-
tafa Tlass, a previous Defense Minister said those military offic-
ers who took up housing via the military housing establishment 
only had to pay between 46,000 and 64,000 Syrian pounds for 
houses in Damascus that were worth as much as 170,000 to 
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200,000 Syrian pounds.65 Proximity to the state and levels of 
state loyalty played an important role in the quality of housing 
that was received, and clear benefits were given to certain com-
munities that contributed to uneven development, and ultimately 
the state securing political loyalties.  
Until the civil war actually began, there was no systemic 
destruction and regeneration of areas in an attempt to quell op-
position, rather it was an attempt to boost Syria’s status in the 
world and as described by former Economics Minister, Abdullah 
Al-Dardari, Syria was trying to aspire towards being a ‘middle 
to upper income society which with the onset of the war, was no 
longer a possibility.66 The historical contextualization of both 
Damascus and Aleppo’s urban development reinforces the way 
in which informal housing and urban development more gener-
ally interacted with political authoritarianism and loyalties that 
revolved around identities in the country. The sentiments of 
those citizens of Aleppo mentioned above still persist to this day 
and if informal housing is not treated as a priority issue and hous-
ing is made affordable and available to all citizens regardless of 
political loyalty or identity-based affiliations, this will continue 
even into post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
 
2011 – present: civil war and redevelopment  
In Spring 2011 it was reported that all European experts had left 
the country and international financiers and corporations in-
volved in construction projects had mostly left too. 67 Despite 
this, there were attempts to continue the construction of informal 
settlements and carry on real estate projects to emphasise the fact 
that Syria as a whole was still carrying out ‘business as usual’, 
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but it was clear that large scale demolitions and destruction of 
Syria’s infrastructure was taking place.  
It has been recognised that the general destruction in the 
country was used as a way to erase unruly populations and I 
would argue re-write geographies68. Clear patterns emerged 
from the destruction efforts and one was the focus on targeting 
informal housing where opposition to the regime had become 
concentrated. The website Syria Tracker traced the total deaths 
of Syrians by geography, documenting both regime and opposi-
tion group killings. By December 2012, more than half of all 
deaths in Aleppo took place in only 15 out of 56 neighbourhoods 
of the city, and in Damascus, 65% of all deaths took place in 
only 7 neighbourhoods. In Aleppo these were Salah ad-Din, Al-
Sukkary, Bustan al-Qasr, al-Sha’ar, al-Firdos, Masaken Hanano, 
Al-Haydariyah, Sakhour, Tariq Al-Bab, Marjeh, Qadi Askar, 
Sayf al-Dawla, Karm al-Jabal, Bustan al-Basha and al-Amriyah. 
In Damascus the areas were Qaboun, Jobar, Hajar al-Aswad, 
Qadam, Tadamon, Yarmouk and Sayyida Zeinab - the majority 
of these being informal settlements.69 It is clear that informal ar-
eas are viewed as a threat to the regime and have come to sym-
bolize political opposition. The discussion in this paper is 
concerned with the more targeted demolitions particularly in the 
suburbs of Damascus that tie together the narrative above of a 
new vision for Syria that rests on a wealthier and more obedient 
population.  
Decree 66 of 2012 was one of the most infamous contem-
porary laws that continued the regime’s process of demolition 
and re-development in Damascus. It has been criticised as an at-
tempt to erase political opposition under the guise of informal - 
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which is now more stringently synonymous with illegal - hous-
ing. Decree 66 focused on ‘organizing irregular areas and infor-
mal housing’ in two zones of Damascus: the South East area of 
Mezzeh and Kafr Sousseh, and the Southern area of Darayya and 
Qadam.70 So far, this organization of irregular areas has mani-
fested in destroying old residences and replacing them with up-
graded luxury housing. The idea was to start in Damascus and if 
successful branch out to other cities such as Aleppo. As early as 
2010 this kind of project was being planned for the Northern city 
of Homs. The Homs Dream Project saw the demolition of infor-
mal housing in the East of the city for another luxury complex.71 
Eastern Homs and these informal areas were sites of intense vi-
olence and confrontation during the beginning of the civil war. 
These plans were clearly part of a vision for Syria that pre-dated 
the civil war, tied to a strategy of wanting to regenerate more run 
down and poorer areas of the country, but they were exacerbated 
and even justified in the regime’s point of view when citizens 
decided to politicize their social situation. The targeted areas 
destined for reconstruction have raised concerns that this is an 
attempt to solidify authoritarian rule by engineering demo-
graphic change in the city.72 
In Damascus, one of the projects cuts through the area of 
Mezzeh. Mezzeh is split between the loyalist citizens of Mezzeh 
86 who moved to the area in the 1970s, particularly from the 
Assad homeland of Latakia, and Mezzeh Basateen which is 
home to more working-class majority Sunni residents. The site 
that faced targeted demolition in 2012 was the area of Mezzeh 
Basateen near Al-Razi Hospital. It is around 2.15 million square 
metres of land and redevelopment efforts were taking place close 
to the Iranian Embassy and Mezzeh Military Airport.73 As men-
tioned previously, Damascus has the air of a fortified city, and 
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political opposition in areas so close to the Iranian Embassy and 
an airport are a risk for the regime. The project which intends to 
create a new city/complex called Marota City, meaning ‘sover-
eignty/homeland’ in ancient Syriac, aims to build 12,000 hous-
ing units for approximately 60,000 residents. This mini city 
razed an entire area to the ground as is shown in the satellite 
imagery below. The use of Ancient Syriac as opposed to Arabic 
to name the city also attempts to build a cultural narrative that 
goes back in time, beyond Arab nationalism and Ottoman con-
quests, and that pulls on a deeper historical tradition aiming to 
unite citizens or rebuild a new Syrian identity, and as a result 
erasing more contemporary political antagonisms. 
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[Human Rights Watch satellite imagery showing demolition of 
Mezze in 2012] 
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Marota City aims to have schools, restaurants, mosques, a 
car park, a shopping mall and at least three 50-floor skyscrapers. 
The original inhabitants of this Mezzeh Basateen area are people 
from rural and low-income backgrounds, and from as early as 
2009, residents were worried about the state wanting to demolish 
their homes.74 This project didn’t officially receive funding until 
2015 through legislative Decree 19, but fears of demolition from 
poorer residents was an existential threat pre-civil war.  
The Basilia Project is another example of a mini-city in-
tended to be built near the Marota City complex in South/South 
Western Damascus. But it is still feeding into the same concerns 
as Marota City. One resident in a local newspaper states: 
 
“The problem is that there is no clear vision of the solution. They 
said there is an [sic] alternative housing, and we will not go out 
before it is secured, but so far, the alternative housing has not 
been secured and the rent is very high in the capital. “75 
 
Another resident mentions people selling the shares of the prop-
erties they own and moving to more affordable neighbourhoods 
such as Qatana and Jdeidah Artuz.76  
 
A resident of Qaboun also comments: 
 
“We think the regime will convert the neighbourhood, after its 
reconstruction, into a military zone, or something resembling the 
loyalist neighbourhoods in Damascus and on its fringes, along 
the lines of al Mazze 86, al Tadhamun and al Sumeriyya…How 
are we to return to live in our neighbourhood if its demographic 
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makeup has changed? Perhaps we’ll be accused of sectarianism, 
but let’s call it like it is: none of al Qaboun’s residents is [sic] 
going to return to live side by side with those who had a hand in 
their murder and displacement”77 
 
Today, Qaboun is part of the area designated to be re-devel-
oped under Law No. 10 of 2018.78 Qaboun witnessed an intense 
military offensive in 2017 by the regime to regain control, and 
as documented by Human Rights Watch the regime is destroying 
houses without warning and preventing the return of displaced 
people.79 The regime is allowing entry back into Qaboun in an 
arbitrary manner. Human Rights Watch also reports that even 
those neighbourhoods that one can enter have both physical and 
financial restrictions on entering and leaving. For example, one 
must pay 500 Syrian pounds to leave the area to go to central 
Damascus and they must return the same day, they also must 
leave their identification cards at a checkpoint on the way 
there.80 This erratic state protocol strengthens feelings of mis-
trust between the population and the state, raising concerns as to 
whether these laws that aim to regenerate towns are actually 
working in favour of the people or are just the solidification of a 
regime-centred vision for Syrian society.  
Law No. 10 of 2018 decrees that any illegal or unregistered 
properties are to be demolished or returned to the state unless 
official documentation is provided by residents within 30 days 
to prove their ownership. After continued international pressure, 
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residents have now been given up to a year to prove ownership.81 
Only 9% of refugees were reported as having property title deeds 
with them in a 2017 UNHCR/Norwegian Refugee Council re-
port.82 There were no considerations or caveats put in place for 
those who are no longer in the country, or those who were killed 
and have no documentation to prove their death and identity. 
Law No. 10 further intensifies the mistrust that exists 
amongst the Syrian population, particularly those from poorer 
backgrounds who are residents of informal housing and who 
have been living undocumented and relatively undisturbed lives 
until the civil war began. In Darayya, a woman who tried to re-
turn to her home was not allowed to by the regime. She was not 
even allowed to visit her properties and no reason was given as 
to why. Her response was:  
 
“Some people will get an approval. Others won’t,” she said. 
“Hopefully, our name gets on the list and they let us back. We 
didn’t get any promises. We’re just hoping.” 
 
This is a continuation of the climate of fear that existed pre-war, 
and the insistence on not asking any further questions to avoid 
repercussions.83  
 
There is a clear discrepancy between the theory and praxis 
of the Syrian regime’s laws. Five years since Decree 66 and 
Marota City were announced, alternative accommodation has 
not been provided by the state despite explicitly stating in Article 
19 of the legislation for Decree 66 that compensation for evacu-
ees will be provided. Article 45 also says that the state has up to 
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four years after the law passed to provide alternative accommo-
dation.84 In 2015, the governorate of Damascus announced the 
start of demolitions and thus the evacuation of residents which 
was done through eviction notices. The governorate stated that 
there would be monthly compensation to those that were forced 
to leave their homes, but residents claimed that there were no 
such mechanisms in place to ensure money and alternative hous-
ing would be provided. One resident commented on the lack of 
housing available, and the high rent in Damascus that they would 
not be able to afford.85 Residents are pushed out of accommoda-
tion and priced out of their own city due to what is now clearly 
emerging as state-led gentrification efforts under the cover of 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
The Marota City project aims to build the largest commer-
cial mall in Syria, of 97,000 square metres.86 This project 
couldn’t have happened without the cooperation of the private 
sector, and as mentioned previously, these public-private part-
nerships solidified regime-business networks and introduced a 
new wave of Syrian businesspeople who have come from the 
diaspora as well as inside Syria. Samer Foz, a name that has been 
mentioned a lot nowadays with regards to Syria’s reconstruction, 
is helping in the development of the Basateen al-Razi area of 
Mezzeh. Foz is head of the Amman Damascus Joint Stock Com-
pany Group and son of a former member of the Ba’ath Party who 
was close to Hafez al-Assad.87 Samer Foz, hailing from Latakia, 
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is a Sunni businessman and is connected to the regime because 
of their shared desire for profit under the war economy and the 
general interest in the economic growth of Syria88. This crony-
ism transcends sect and ethnicity, and despite the fact that this 
might show that sectarianism is not an issue, this is only the case 
for the Syrian elite. On the ground, these alliances made between 
businesspeople and the regime have class-based ramifications 
that only work to strengthen the identity-based tensions that pull 
on historical grievances in the country.  
Further laws were implemented that encouraged private 
sector engagement whilst still working to retain regime control 
over their actions. Via a loophole, Decree 19 of 2015 allows the 
privatization of local administrative unit’s subsidiaries, giving 
private holding companies control and management over assets 
and properties owned by municipalities across the country.89 In 
October 2016, 25,000 people had subscribed to buy property in 
the Marota City Project and by the end of 2016, the state owned 
Commercial Bank of Syria had approved a loan request by the 
Damascus Governorate of 40 million US dollars for infrastruc-
ture works that would go towards Marota City.90 This was the 
largest loan given out since 2011. The regime even retracted 
their building restrictions on the construction of skyscrapers in 
Damascus in order to put up high rise towers in the Marota City 
project.91 These changes show the importance placed on these 
urban redevelopment projects and the vision of an upgraded, 
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wealthy and prosperous Syria that is exemplified through sky-
scrapers and Gulf-esque design features.  
Accompanying Decree 66 was Decree 63 of 2012 which en-
abled the confiscation of ‘assets and property of people who fall 
under the Counterterrorism Law of 2012’, which are then handed 
over to the state.92 Implementing this law in 2012 at the onset of 
the civil war, when there were people rallying against the state, 
was an intentional attempt to define citizenship in Syria based 
on political affiliation and has been part of the wider regime nar-
rative in Syria since the beginning of the civil war.  
As the civil war has progressed, and 2017 to 2018 has wit-
nessed the winding down of conflict due to the total destruction 
and control by the Syrian regime of opposition held areas, for-
eign investors, particularly Eastern powers such as China, India 
and Iran have been engaging in state-led investment forums and 
reconstruction events.93 These investors are interested in contrib-
uting towards luxury property projects such as Marota City, and 
the new Basilia City project .  
It has been reported that those who fled rebel held areas al-
most always are denied permits, and it provides the opportunity 
for landlords to extort those IDPs who are at their most vulnera-
ble and would pay however much it costs for a permit to move 
to a conflict-free neighbourhood.94 The securitization of neigh-
bourhoods and labelling of residents as dangerous or hostile was 
more explicit during the civil war, and it highlights the problems 
that could arise if money and resources are provided to the re-
gime for post-conflict reconstruction efforts in this current state. 
With a population dispersed, and with some legally prevented 
from getting back to their property, or physically unable to do so 
due to demolitions, there is a concerted effort to reconstruct 
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Syria anew, and in a way that will prevent the social healing of 
war-torn communities by neglecting the primary housing con-
cerns of some of the country’s most disenfranchised citizens. In-
stead, there is a focus on rebuilding Syria’s global image through 
processes of gentrification focused on big cities that will pick up 
where the state left off in the early 2000s with private foreign 
investors and construction companies.  
The regime’s demolitions took place in strategic locations 
which emphasized the importance they placed on protecting per-
ceived threats to sites of power and representations of foreign 
allies of the Syrian regime such as Iran. Geography and urban 
planning do play a role in suppressing, subduing and sometimes 
exacerbating grievances/the potential to revolt, and by recogniz-
ing where one’s unruly or disobedient citizens reside, a state 
could manipulate space to be conducive to their own political 
survival. Of course, what is most important is what is happening 
on the ground, and one resident described the Marota Project as 
just ‘a hole in the ground’.95 It is clear that Decree 66 and Law 
No. 10 are not sustainable urban development plans for the re-
gime in the long-term for a country like Syria and for the eco-
nomic crisis they are currently in, but this uneven geographical 
development will continue to encourage the segregation and hi-
erarchies exemplified in Syria’s urban planning strategies before 
and during the civil war if not addressed. The table below sum-
marizes the relevant laws that have affected urban development. 
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Name of 
Law 
Year Summary 
Decree No. 
96  
1974 Urban development and cooperative housing 
law. Intention of expropriating land to build co-
operative housing societies under regulation of 
local authorities. 
Law No. 60 1979 Another law related to the urban expansion of 
real estate with explicit reference to Damascus.  
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Future reconstruction efforts 
The destruction of peoples’ homes, and the introduction of laws 
that confiscate or place further restrictions on reclaiming prop-
erty, raises concerns about the intention of the regime in facili-
tating easy return for those that have been most affected by the 
violence of the last 7 years. Only recently, Palestinian refugees 
from Yarmouk Camp were denied re-entry by security forces de-
spite the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mikdad notify-
ing Palestinian groups in Damascus that they could return. The 
Aleppo Project carried out a poll through the Chattak Conflict 
Law No. 10 1991 Allowed Syrian, Arab or foreign investors to 
launch private or mixed projects in any aspect 
of the Syrian economy. 
Law No. 26 2000 Urban development law, ‘loosening of man-
date’ of Law 60 of 1979. Intended to give local 
municipalities more flexibility to re zone infor-
mal areas. 
Law No. 1 2003 Illegal housing law. Larger fines and jail for il-
legal builders and local officials responsible. 
Law No. 46 2004 Illegal housing law. Facilitates granting a title 
to informal housing already built. Requires pub-
lic bodies to supply water and electricity.  
Law No. 33 2008 Formalization of informal settlement areas 
through a fee to local authorities. 
Law No. 59 2008 Elimination and eviction of illegal houses – 
sometimes by force.  
Decree No. 
63 
2012 Counterterrorism law. Confiscation of property 
of those deemed terrorists. 
Decree No. 
66 
2012 Urban planning law. Demolition and “re-zon-
ing” of the areas of South West Damascus 
Decree No. 
19 
2015 Privatization of local administrative units, in-
creasing private holding companies control and 
management over municipalities’ assets. 
Law No. 10 2018 Any illegal or unregistered property to be de-
molished unless property documentation is pro-
vided within a year. 
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Centre asking refugees about their prospects for return and half 
of the participants had ‘lost hope in recovering their property’. 96 
Learning from previous conflict scenarios and their reconstruc-
tion efforts will be vital to ensure that Syria will not replicate the 
mistakes of its past.  
Common understandings of states in conflict zones assume 
their control weakens and they turn into a ‘fragile’ state. But one 
understanding of the Syrian state apparatus is that it is more of a 
‘fierce’ as opposed to a ‘fragile’ state, and as a result there needs 
to be an alternative framework for thinking about reconstruction 
efforts.97 Steve Heydemann claims that if the United States, Eu-
ropean Union and the international community as a whole con-
tinue to use this ‘fragility-based model’ to provide development 
aid to Syria, the same conditions and structures will be built be-
cause ultimately one is still working with an authoritarian re-
gime.98 In the section above, we can already see qualities of 
distrust, suspicion and fear that pervaded Syrian civil society be-
fore the war, and are now manifesting as the state begins to re-
generate areas. Heydemann insists that reconstruction aid should 
not intend to bring Syria back in time to a place where it was 
once stable or normal. Reconstruction aid should intend to move 
Syria forward and beyond what it once was, and this requires 
creative thinking that involves a change to tried and tested de-
velopment processes which should include discussions on inno-
vative architecture and urban planning. A few overarching 
points will be raised below using examples from Lebanon and 
the Balkans to show where reconstruction efforts worked and 
didn’t work so well.   
 
Re-politicizing reconstruction efforts – right of return 
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Despite Russian calls to de-politicize reconstruction, this simply 
is not possible if the only conduit through which reconstruction 
aid can be delivered is through the current regime. It is necessary 
to understand the actors one is working with in order to under-
stand the feasibility of successful, inclusive reconstruction ef-
forts. It has been reported that the humanitarian aid administered 
by the United Nations was totally controlled by the Syrian re-
gime.99 Is it right for the international community to go through 
the motions of administering aid money when there is no guar-
antee that a durable political transition will be in place to accom-
pany the physical reconstruction of the country? How can 
political biases be avoided and how can one be sure that the gen-
trification of Damascus will at the minimum be accompanied by 
primary housing needs for the less well off in the capital city? 
One issue that Syrian activists, organisers and researchers 
have emphasised that is tied to reconstruction efforts is the abil-
ity for displaced Syrians to return to their cities.100 There are lo-
gistical issues to returning, and also the climate of fear and lack 
of trust that surrounds return to Syria – how much has the polit-
ical context really changed?  
 
Centring local participation 
In Sarajevo, similar projects took place to what is happening in 
Damascus; that of large scale commercial malls that lack real 
human interaction or a link to the history and traditions of the 
area. 88% of the population in Sarajevo wanted to support better 
inter-ethnic relations but the physical construction of the city 
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wasn’t enough to help citizens overcome the traumas of war.101 
With physical reconstruction came new narratives of the city and 
its people, a new future was being written that did not necessarily 
align with the aspirations of the citizens or give them enough 
time to recover from the trauma of the war and there is the po-
tential for this to happen in Aleppo and Syria as a whole. Aleppo 
is historically a trading city, it has a tradition of merchants, local 
businesses and each neighbourhood has its own idiosyncrasies 
that are tied to patterns of migration, demographic make-up and 
levels of wealth. An attempt to homogenize neighbourhoods and 
cities along these commercialized and explicitly neoliberal ge-
ographies and architectures can present serious obstacles to 
those who wish to return to their homes and recover from nearly 
a decade of turmoil.  
One way in which to ensure these local histories and geog-
raphies are not re-written is to encourage local participation in 
reconstruction efforts. The Aleppo Project’s polling also found 
that 150 of the refugees that were polled placed an emphasis on 
civil society and local participation in reconstruction efforts.102 
Local participation is something that has been emphasised across 
conflicts in order to enable the reconstruction of urban environ-
ments that fit the requirements, needs and prospects for future 
social cohesion of the local populations. The inclusion of resi-
dents will also work to rebuild trust that either did not exist or 
was lost during the violence.  
 
The role of women in Syrian civil society 
In addition to the need for more local inclusion, particular atten-
tion needs to be given to the role of women in Syrian civil and 
political society. Older men in the family are usually the people 
whose name is on property documentation, and this leaves 
women at a disadvantage when it comes to moments of crisis 
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and conflict particularly when the men in the family are either 
fighting or have ended up being killed. In a survey for the 2018 
Humanitarian Needs Overview, over half of the women who had 
documents for their property said they were issued in the names 
of their older male relatives.103 A 2015 report from the Tahrir 
Institute for Middle East Policy stated that between 12-17% of 
households in Syria were headed by women. That has risen from 
4.4% in 2009 to 22.4% in 2017. Women are now making up the 
majority of certain workforces, with 90% of the agricultural 
workforce being women.104 Despite laws in place since 1949 
claiming equality in women’s rights, cultural and religious ob-
stacles have impeded this, and Syrian women need their legal 
rights now more than ever as well as the opportunities to play 
meaningful and non-tokenistic roles in post-conflict reconcilia-
tion in Syria. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1325 on women’s participation in security and peacebuilding 
measures also supports this recognition of a dire absence in 
women’s voices in conflict-resolution.105 
 
Conclusion 
The Syrian Civil War has brought out the worst of identity-based 
grievances that existed in the country since the beginning of the 
Ba’athist era. Despite this paper showing that there was no clear 
urban development strategy before the civil war, as highlighted 
through the erratic land and housing strategies, it is difficult to 
ignore the regime’s attempt to quell opposition and secure polit-
ical loyalties through interacting with informal housing – 
whether it was by destruction or criminalization or neglect. Ul-
timately, there still is no urban development strategy to this day, 
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and this is the core of the problem. Urban development has been 
a confused act of firefighting to ensure political stability and sup-
port. If it was necessary to appease certain identity-based com-
munities over others, this would be done to ensure the status quo 
persisted. If this lack of strategy persists post-conflict, the state 
will be reproducing the same problems that led to the housing 
crisis and violence in the first place and will increase the lack of 
trust amongst the population’s varied communities.  
Identity has always been utilized by the Syrian state in an 
effort to maintain power, but it was used fluidly – as is the nature 
of identity. As shown in the historical analyses, sect and ethnic-
ity were at one point a way to ascertain whether someone was 
politically loyal. Class and economic status were also used to 
encourage a more stimulated private sector. These identities 
sometimes overlapped, and ethnic groups were prioritized and 
given economic benefits – job opportunities, better housing, eas-
ier access to cities – and as a result they climbed the socio-eco-
nomic ladder. This paper is not suggesting sectarianized 
identities and their grievances should be the primary lens to un-
derstand the civil war, but it is an important piece of the story. 
The civil war dynamic exposed the fractures in Syria’s so-
ciety and with it, it is possible to understand some of the griev-
ances the population held, particularly relating to the country’s 
housing crisis. 2,280 communities out of the 4,006 communities 
that were surveyed for the 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview 
said that housing was an issue of concern.106 It is clear that in 
any post-conflict scenario that has witnessed large scale demoli-
tion, housing is going to be a concern. But what is even more of 
a concern is when the government of the day is facilitating a 
problematic transition into peacetime that does not place primary 
housing – especially for working class citizens that had clear po-
litical grievances - as a priority.  
This analysis of the regime’s use of urban development as 
a way to consolidate political loyalties is important to understand 
                                                     
106 Clutterbuck, M. Property restitution in post-conflict Syria. 
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because of the reconstruction efforts and discussion of recon-
struction aid taking place in the political discourse on the Syrian 
Civil War today. How this reconstruction aid is distributed, how 
it manifests in terms of the architectural design and urban plan-
ning of Syrian cities and to who it is administered to, are all vital 
questions to ask in order to ensure Syria is not going to be re-
peating the same mistakes of the Balkans, Lebanon or Northern 
Ireland.  
All evidence points towards the fact that reconstruction aid 
should not be channelled through the regime alone as it currently 
stands unless there is a clear commitment to facilitating the re-
turn of Syrian refugees and a political transition that is inclusive 
of local community groups and that will allow meaningful input 
into the reconstruction of Syria’s cities. Identity-based tensions 
have been exacerbated by the regime’s ghettoization of commu-
nities into informal neighbourhoods, and the continued planning 
and construction of Marota and Basilia Cities does not bode well 
for a future projection of Syria that is inclusive, democratic and 
socially egalitarian. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
